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Abstract 
 
The turnover of heterogeneous firms has been shown to behave differently at business cycle frequencies. Traditionally it has been 
noted that the turnover of small firms is more procyclical. The evidence is however less unambiguous when it comes to more 
recent business cycle contractions, such as the financial crisis. Majority of the literature considers access to credit to be the driving 
force behind the differences in cyclicality. Due to asymmetrical information banks intermediating credit consider small firms to be 
riskier than large. During an economic downturn, safe investments are favored and thus the wedge in access to credit between 
large and small firms increases. The thesis consequently focuses on the impact of supply of credit on firms. More specifically, the 
study looks at the responses of firms of different size in Finland to unconventional monetary policy shocks by the European Central 
Bank (ECB). 
 
Unconventional monetary policy shocks are identified in several ways in the thesis. All approaches are based on a six-variate 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The euro wide variables are the gross domestic product (GDP), consumer prices, ECB’s 
balance sheet, financial stress measured by the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS), the spread between the EONIA 
(Euro OverNight Index Average) and main refinancing operations (MRO) rates and the MRO rate. All variables are provided by 
either the ECB or Eurostat. The series were aggregated or interpolated to a monthly frequency and seasonally adjusted if needed. 
The turnover data for Finnish firms is from Statistics Finland. Sales inquiry data collected by Statistics Finland is used as the series 
for large firms. On the other hand, the series for small firms is based on value added tax data, which covers nearly the entire 
economy. The turnovers of large and small firms enter the baseline model one at a time. The thesis concentrates on a time period 
during which the unconventional measures have been in place, that is between January 2010 up until December 2018. 
 
In the thesis, the impact of unconventional monetary policy measures such as the targeted longer-term refinancing operations and 
the asset purchase programme is studied through the balance sheet of the ECB. Zero and sign restrictions are used to uncover the 
structural shocks. In the baseline identification, a shock to the central bank’s balance sheet is assumed to increase the size of the 
ECB’s balance sheet and decrease financial stress as well as the EONIA-MRO spread for two months. It is additionally assumed 
that the shock does not have affect GDP, prices and the MRO rate upon impact. The restrictions are implemented through a 
Bayesian rejection algorithm. The algorithm draws a variance-covariance decomposition from the posterior distribution of the 
model and checks whether is produces impulse responses that fulfill the restrictions. The results are represented as the median 
response of the accepted draws. 
 
The results indicate that a shock to the balance sheet of the ECB increases the turnovers of both small and large Finnish firms. 
The positive impact manifests in two stages; it peaks some three months after the shock for the first time and later again. The 
impact on small firms is at its highest within 12 months of the innovation. The response of the turnover of large firms is less 
pronounced directly after the shock but lasts for longer. In summary, the results suggest that the impact is stronger for small firms 
but more persistent for large. Therefore, the thesis concludes that unconventional monetary policy measures have not benefited 
small Finnish firms disproportionately. 
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Tiedekunta/Osasto 
 Valtiotieteellinen tiedekunta 
Laitos 
 Politiikan ja talouden tutkimuksen laitos 
Tekijä 
 Ada Reetta Alexandra Karinluoma 
Työn nimi  
 EKP:n epätavanomaisen rahapolitiikan vaikutus erikokoisiin yrityksiin Suomessa: Makroanalyysi nolla- ja merkkirajoitteisella 
SVAR-mallilla. 
Oppiaine 
 Taloustiede 
Työn laji 
 Maisterin tutkielma 
Aika 
 Huhtikuu 2020  
Sivumäärä 
 75 
Tiivistelmä 
 
Erikokoisten yritysten liikevaihdon on havaittu reagoivan suhdannekäänteisiin eri tavoin. Perinteisesti kirjallisuudessa on havaittu, 
että pienten yritysten liikevaihto on suuria yrityksiä myötäsyklisempää. Tuoreempien taantumien, kuten finanssikriisin, kohdalla 
tulokset ovat tosin olleet vähemmän yksiselitteisiä. Valtaosa kirjallisuudesta pitää rahoituksen saatavuutta suurimpana selittäjänä 
eroille syklisyydessä. Epäsymmetrisen informaation vuoksi rahoitusta välittävät pankit pitävät pieniä yrityksiä suuria riskialttiimpina. 
Taantumassa rahoitus suuntautuu entistä vahvemmin vähäriskisiin kohteisiin, eli suuremmille yrityksille. Tästä syystä tutkielmassa 
tarkastellaan rahoituksen tarjonnan vaikutusta yritystasolla. Kiinnostuksen kohteena on erityisesti Euroopan keskuspankin 
epätavanomaisten rahapolitiikkashokkien vaikutus erikokoisiin yrityksiin Suomessa. 
 
Tutkielmassa identifioidaan epätavanomaisia rahapolitiikkashokkeja usealla eri tavalla. Kaikkien lähestymistapojen pohjalla on 
vektoriautoregressiivinen (VAR) malli, jossa muuttujina on bruttokansantuote (BKT), kuluttajahinnat, EKP:n taseen koko, 
rahoitusmarkkinoiden stressiä kuvaava composite indicator of systemic stress eli CISS-indikaattori, Eoniakoron (euro overnight 
index average) ja perusrahoitusoperaatioiden koron välinen erotus sekä perusrahoitusoperaatioiden korko. Kaikki muuttujat ovat 
EKP:n tai Eurostatin tuottamia euroalueen keskiarvoja, jotka on aggregoitu tai interpoloitu kuukausittaisiksi havainnoiksi. Sarjat on 
lisäksi kausitasoitettu tarvittaessa. Suomalaisten yritysten liikevaihtodata on peräisin Tilastokeskuksesta. Suurten yritysten 
liikevaihtoa edustaa suurilta yrityksiltä kuukausittain kerättävä myyntiedusteluaineisto. Pienten yritysten data perustuu 
Verohallinnolta saatavaan oma-aloitteisten verojen aineistoon, joka kattaa lähes koko Suomen yritystoiminnan. Pienten ja suurten 
yritysten liikevaihtoaineistot lisätään pohjana olevaan malliin yksi kerrallaan. Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan muuttujien välisiä suhteita 
aikana, jolloin EKP on harjoittanut epätavanomaista rahapolitiikkaa: tammikuusta 2010 joulukuuhun 2018. 
 
Epätavanomaisen rahapolitiikan, kuten pidempiaikaisten rahoitusoperaatioiden ja omaisuuserien osto-ohjelman vaikutusta 
tutkitaan mallissa EKP:n taseen kautta.  Rakenteellisen shokin identifioinnissa käytetään nolla- ja merkkirajoitteita. Keskuspankin 
taseeseen kohdistuvan shokin oletetaan kasvattavan tasetta, laskevan rahoitusmarkkinoiden stressiä ja painavan Eonia- ja 
perusrahoitusoperaatioiden korkojen erotusta alas kahden kuukauden ajan. Lisäksi oletetaan, että shokki ei välittömästä vaikuta 
BKT:hen, euroalueen kuluttajahintoihin tai perusrahoitusoperaatioiden korkoon. Identifiointi perustuu Bayesiläiseen 
hylkäysalgoritmiin, jossa pohjana olevan mallin posteriorijakaumasta otetaan virheiden varianssi-kovarianssihajotelma ja 
tarkistetaan, tuottaako se rajoitteiden mukaisen impulssivasteen. Tulokset esitetään hyväksyttyjen otosten mediaanina. 
 
Tutkielmassa osoitetaan, että EKP:n taseeseen kohdistuva shokki kasvattaa pienten ja suurten yritysten liikevaihtoa. Kasvu on 
kaksivaiheista; se on korkeimmillaan ensimmäisen kerran noin kolme kuukautta shokin jälkeen ja uudestaan myöhemmin. Vaikutus 
pienten yritysten liikevaihtoon on suurimmillaan vuoden sisällä shokista. Suurten yritysten liikevaihto kasvaa ensimmäisinä 
kuukausina shokin jälkeen vähemmän suhteessa pieniin, mutta positiivinen vaikutus kestää pidempään. Tiivistettynä 
epätavanomainen rahapolitiikkashokki vaikuttaa voimakkaammin pieniin yrityksiin, mutta pitkäkestoisemmin suuriin. Pienet 
yritykset eivät siten hyödy EKP:n epätavanomaisesta rahapolitiikasta yksiselitteisesti enemmän. 
Avainsanat 
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1 Introduction
The asymmetrical performance of firms of different size at business cycle fre-
quencies has been a topic of interest since the seminal work of Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994). Informational asymmetries and the difficulties
in obtaining external credit it creates for small firms is established in Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1987). Fazzari et al. (1987) use data from the man-
ufacturing sector to demonstrate that firms’ investment decisions are driven
by their cash flow. That is, firms cannot easily substitute internal with ex-
ternal debt and thus they have to adjust their investments instead. Bernanke
et al. (1994) build on the established imperfections in the capital market and
present a theoretical model where the supply of intermediated credit such as
bank loans for small firms depreciates disproportionately compared to large
at economic downturns.
Bernanke et al. (1994) suggest that at economic downturns investors chan-
nel their money to safe investments. Due to informational asymmetries, more
credit is granted to large firms than small and the difference increases along
with uncertainty. At economic downturns small firms’ demand for credit in-
creases as they strive to keep their operations running through the slump,
whereas many large firms have access to internal debt and thus their need for
credit is not as acute. The inefficient division of credit can further amplify
the initial shock. The theory of Bernanke et al. (1994), known as the finan-
cial accelerator, thus suggests that small firms suffer disproportionately at
times when credit is tight, which can have an adverse impact on the economy
as a whole.
As additional evidence, for example Hadlock and Pierce (2010) verify that
firm size (coupled with age) is a good predictor of the financial constraint level
of the firm. Artola and Genre (2011) use micro level data to show that while
majority of European firms perceived to be facing a credit crunch during the
2007–2009 crisis, the firms that actually encountered financial restrictions
were young and small. In their seminal paper, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
show that the disproportional financial constraints of small firms transmit
to their turnover. They find that the turnover of small firms with respect to
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large in the manufacturing sector declines after periods of tight credit. The
results are however less clear when it comes to recessions. Due to the above
result, we take the stance of, for example, Abo-Zaid and Zervou (2020). Abo-
Zaid and Zervou (2020) assume that monetary policy shocks, rather than the
business cycle frequency, are the driving force behind the asymmetries found
between heterogeneous firms. We additionally assume that while most of
the literature considers periods of tight credit, the impact of expansionary
monetary policy is likewise asymmetrical in it’s impact, only in favor of small
firms.
We therefore concentrate on the heterogeneous impact of monetary pol-
icy on firms of different size. More specifically, we focus on the monetary
policy measures taken by the European Central Bank (ECB)1 during the
last decade. The 2010’s have been a period of economic turmoil and sluggish
growth. The twin crisis, starting with the global crash of 2007–2009 and
followed by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone challenged conventional
monetary policy. At the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis the key inter-
est rates set by the ECB were already close to zero. Therefore the central
bank was compelled to take unforeseen actions in order to boost the econ-
omy and restore faith in the euro. These unconventional monetary policy
measures have included, among other things, refinancing operations and di-
rect asset purchases. Both measures operate through expanding the balance
sheet of the Eurosystem rather than by altering the policy rate. Therefore
a specific model for studying the impact of an balance sheet shock is needed
to establish their impact.
Our hypothesis is that the unconventional measures have benefited es-
pecially credit constrained firms, which, as stated above, tend to be small
and medium-sized enterprises (SME). To put it bluntly, our question is: have
the ECB’s balance sheet policies increased the turnover of smaller firms in
Finland disproportionately compared to large? In order to establish a causal
relationship, we use a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model in line
1For convenience, we will use the terms European Central Bank and the Eurosystem
interchangeably, while acknowledging the fact that the ECB is only one of the institutions
responsible for monetary policy in the euro zone.
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with Boeckx, Dossche, and Peersman (2017). We identify a shock to the
balance sheet with sign and zero restrictions in a Bayesian manner. The
model by Boeckx et al. (2017) is especially tailored for the euro area and
for disentangling balance sheet shocks that are orthogonal to other potential
forces at play.
The model however identifies the unconventional monetary policy shock
through the size of the ECB’s balance sheet and therefore excludes responses
at the time of announcement of the policy measures. We consider the an-
nouncement effects by altering the baseline model in two ways. First, we
replace the size of the European Central Bank’s balance sheet with the accu-
mulated asset purchase announcements, which are part of the asset purchase
programme. This approach builds on, for example, Weale and Wieladek
(2016). Second, we identify a shock to the balance sheet based on the rest
of the variables in our model, excluding an actual measure for the balance
sheet. This alteration rests on Hesse, Hofmann, and Weber (2018) and takes
both the refinancing operations as well as the asset purchases into account.
We use a time period of 2010M01–2018M12 for the estimation of all of the
three approaches; the baseline model as well as the alterations.
The results show that the announcement of an expansionary balance sheet
policy measure significantly increases the turnover of large and small Finnish
firms within three months of the innovation. The initial impact is, on average,
slightly stronger for small firms, for which the peak median response is 0.25%.
The response of the turnover of small firms peaks again around seven months
after the shock and fades after some 20 months. The second wave of impact
is lower and more sluggish for large firms for it peaks around 18 months
after the shock. The response of large firm turnover is then again more
persistent as it is significant for nearly two and a half years. Therefore the
results indicate a stronger, but less persistent impact on the turnover of small
Finnish firms.
Our interest in studying the impact on precisely Finnish firms was sparked
by the notion made with respect to a business cycle statistic in Finland.
Trend Indicator of Output (TIO) is a statistic produced by Statistics Finland.
It is the earliest estimate of monthly development of the Finnish economy,
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which still builds on actual data from economic agents. The TIO aims at
anticipating the trend of the economy nearly in real time. The performance
of a statistic can be judged based on the revision from the time the statistic is
first published until the last vintage. The mean error of an unbiased statistic
should be zero, meaning that once more data is collected, it is equally likely
that the figure is revised up or down. That has been more or less the case for
the seasonally adjusted month-on-month change of the TIO between 2010
and mid-2014.2
On the other hand, from June 2014 up to spring 2020 the 6-month moving
average of the revisions has been consistently positive, peaking as high as 0.8
percentage points in the end of 2015. This means that the initial estimate has,
on average, severely underestimated the monthly growth for nearly six years
and counting. Peltonen (2016) addresses the issue as the senior statistician
in charge of the figures. She suggests that the revisions are due to the fact
that the figures are based on sales data collected from a sample of large
companies and that small firms do better, at least at the time. That leads
to the economy-wide output being underestimated.
Our topic is thus interesting from the viewpoint of data quality. Statisti-
cal authorities follow a guideline stating that the burden a firm faces when
reporting to the authorities should be reasonable compared to the benefit
that can be obtained from the information. Based on this trade-off, the gen-
eral rule stands that the larger the firm, the more in terms of quantity or
frequency they have to report. It would additionally be very costly to collect
data from a random sample of the whole body of firms in the economy on a
monthly basis. The TIO is therefore not the only statistic that rests on data
collected from the largest firms.
There are naturally obligations that even the smallest operators cannot
escape, such as reporting to tax authorities. The corresponding registry data
is however available for other authorities only with a significant lag in Finland
and thus cannot be utilized in timely statistics such as the TIO. Asymmet-
rical behaviour of heterogeneous firms would jeopardize the trustworthiness
of the earliest estimates of the state of the economy, which would complicate
2http://www.stat.fi/til/ktkk/rev.html
4
the work of policymakers and other authorities that rely on the data. There-
fore understanding the differences in how firms behave has important social
benefits. Our work contributes to this knowledge.
The period during which the revisions of the TIO have been consistently
positive coincides with expansionary balance sheet policy measures by the
European Central Bank. Therefore our aim was to additionally see whether
unconventional monetary policy in the euro zone would explain the revi-
sions. The results show that while the impact on turnover of large and small
Finnish firms is asymmetrical, it is not unambiguously stronger for small
firms. Therefore the source of the revisions of the TIO remains a mystery.
Our work contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First,
the impact of traditional monetary policy is a well studied topic, but the same
can hardly be said about the unconventional measures taken in the aftermath
of the crises. A vast majority of the literature on unconventional measures
considers areas other than Europe, such as the work on negative interest rates
in Japan or quantitative easing in the United States. Therefore our work adds
to the scarcer literature concerning policy transmission in the euro area and
into heterogeneous firms. We are additionally, to our knowledge, the first ones
to study the impact of the unconventional measures on the turnover of firms
at the aggregate level. The literature is divided to VAR models considering
the impact of the policies on macro variables such as gross domestic product
(GDP) or event studies where microeconometric tools are used to uncover
the impact on individual firms. We intend to combine these two aspects. We
are additionally the first ones to study the impact of balance sheet policies
on Finnish firms, due to the fact that the data typically used in event studies
in the euro zone is confidential and thus not publicly available for Finland.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In the next section, we
provide an overview of the unconventional monetary policy measures taken
by the European Central Bank. Section three summarizes essential strands
of literature and empirical evidence found elsewhere. In the fourth section
we presents the structural VAR model as well as the identification strategies
we use to disentangle unconventional monetary policy shocks targeted at
expanding the balance sheet of the ECB. Section 5 reports and discusses the
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results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Unconventional monetary policy measures
in Europe
In the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis the European Central Bank has
struggled to reach its mandate of inflation close to (but below) two percent
as well as keeping the credit conditions for non-financial corporations and
households adequate. Inflation fell from the beginning of 2012, reaching
negative values in mid-2015 and again in early 2016. The conventional tool
of lowering the policy rates3 was considered insufficient due to the fact that
interest rates were low to begin with. Negative deposit facility rate would
mean that banks effectively need to pay for the money they deposit with
the Eurosystem, which nudges banks to lend further the money they receive
as deposits. In that sense lowering the policy rates below zero should boost
the economy similarly to conventional monetary policy. There are however
reasons why it might not work as planned.
Banks could be reluctant to pass big negative policy rates onto the de-
posits of customers in order to avoid losing them. In that case banks are also
unable to lower the interest rates on loans they issue any further without
making loss in the loan-deposit margin. Banks end up paying the negative
rates but there is no impact on the supply of loans or real economy. If
banks decide to pass the negative rates forward, the threat of a liquidity trap
emerges. Due to the negative rates, household have no incentive to save and
thus invest anymore. Instead they begin to hoard money, further deepening
the economic slump. The stage at which conventional monetary policy stops
working in the way explained above is known as the zero lower bound4, even
though it could be well below zero.
3The policy rates are a collection of interest rates that the central bank sets in order
to determine their monetary policy stance. For the European Central Bank, these include
the rate at which commercial banks can borrow for one week as well as the rate they have
to pay in order to deposit money with the Eurosystem.
4There is a wide literature surrounding the zero lower bound and it’s existence has
since been challenged. It nevertheless affected the actions of the ECB after the crises.
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Something nevertheless needed to be done to boost inflation. The neces-
sity stemmed from the risk of a deflationary trap. Even modest deflation can
cause a harmful situation where households start postponing investments and
consumption because they expect prices to drop further in the future. The
postponing further diminishes growth making it all the more difficult for the
economy to recover. Therefore the Eurosystem took up a number of uncon-
ventional monetary policy measures. In June 2014 the Governing Council5
decided, as the first major central bank, to lower the deposit facility rate
below zero. The deposit facility rate reached -0.40% by March 2016 and was
lowered again to -0.50% on September 2019. The negative policy rates were
combined with refinancing operations, asset purchases and forward guidance,
which we’ll go through in detail over the next sections.
2.1 Targeted longer-term refinancing operations
The targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) provide long-
term financing to credit institutions. Their aim is to maintain liquidity in
the banking sector and stimulate lending. The operations were introduced
in three stages, first TLTRO in June 2014, TLTRO II in March 2016 and
TLTRO III in March 2019. Financing from the all of the TLTRO stages is
conditional on lending the money to non-financial firms and households. In
the first stage the conditionality was issued such that in case of failing to
increase their credit supply to the private sector above a certain threshold,
the bank in question had to repay the loan. In the second and third stage, the
more the participating banks issued loans to private sector, the lower interest
rate they faced for their TLTRO borrowings. The interest rates could go as
low as to negative rates, creating a strong incentive to banks.
The targeted longer-term refinancing operations are especially targeted at
providing additional liquidity for non-financial firms and households. There-
fore their significance in easing the credit conditions of SMEs is likely high.
Suomen Pankki (2019) asses the performance of the operations. The TLTRO
5The Governing Council is the main decision-making body of the ECB. It consists of
the Executive Board as well as the heads of the national central banks in the euro zone.
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II was very successful in encouraging lending; a total of EUR 739 billion was
borrowed by banks under the scheme. According to Suomen Pankki (2019),
the banks that participated in the operation also increased corporate lend-
ing relative to those who didn’t. Then again, there is potential for selection
bias and therefore causality cannot be concluded based on quantitative data
alone.
2.2 Asset purchase programmes
The European Central Bank additionally started asset purchases in mid-2014.
The purchases comprise a set of programmes, each with their own specific
targets. These include corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP), public
sector purchase programme (PSPP), asset-backed securities purchase pro-
gramme (ABSPP) and the third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3).
Some purchases are targeted at non-financial firms and households and thus
have direct impact on the credit conditions of SMEs. Others only affect
SMEs indirectly by increasing the amount of money in the economy. Next
we will briefly go through the different programmes.
The asset-backed securities and third covered bond purchase pro-
grammes
The asset-backed securities purchase programme started in October 2014.
The eligible securities include those secured by for example home loans, car
loans, consumer loans and business loans. In addition, they have to have a
sufficient credit quality obtained from an external credit assessment institu-
tion. There is, on the other hand, no defined minimum or maximum maturity
for the securities. From April 2017 onward, the asset-backed securities have
been purchased exclusively by six national banks (Bank of Finland is not
included in the group) on behalf of the rest.
The third covered bond purchase programme likewise started in October
2014 and is targeted at bonds issued by the banking sector and secured by
mortgages or loans to public sector entities. The programme is carried out
by many national central banks as well as the ECB. There is similarly no
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defined minimum or maximum maturity for the securities. The third covered
bond purchase programme covers a large part of total purchases directed at
the private sector.
The public sector purchase programme
The public sector purchase programme started in March 2015. Under the
programme, the Eurosystem itself purchases bonds issued by regional and
local governments as well as recognised agencies and international institu-
tions located in the euro area. By the end of 2018, the Eurosystem had
purchased securities from 110 issuers. The national central banks purchase
mainly bonds issued by their own government, relative to the size of their
government. For 80 percent of the purchases, the risks are carried by the cen-
tral banks themselves. The purchases were in total over EUR 2,100 billion in
March 2020, therefore being by a share of nearly half the largest component
of the total assets held by the Eurosystem. The impact of the public sector
purchases on SMEs is likely indirect.
The corporate sector purchase programme
The corporate sector purchasing programme started in June 2016. It differs
from other other forms of unconventional monetary policy in that it offers
direct central bank lending to non-financial corporations. Therefore it im-
pacts real economy without the banking sector serving as a middleman. The
programme is carried out by Bank of Finland and five other national central
banks acting on behalf of the Eurosystem, coordinated by the ECB. Each
central bank is responsible for purchases from issuers in a particular part of
the euro area. There is a set of eligibility rules both for the issuer and the
debt instruments. The issuers must be non-bank corporations established in
the euro area. In some cases also corporations with ultimate parent outside
euro area are eligible. The debt instruments, again, have to be issued in the
euro zone and denominated in euro. In addition, they have to have a suffi-
cient credit quality obtained from an external credit assessment institution,
similarly to the debt instruments accepted for the corporate sector purchase
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programme. Lastly, the instrument has to have a remaining maturity of six
months to 30 years at the time of purchase. The purchases ended in Decem-
ber 2018 and restarted in November 2019. According to Ertan, Kleymenova,
and Tuijn (2020), eligible firms have substituted bank loans for the bond fi-
nance offered by the corporate sector purchases. The demand for loans from
large firms has increased loans granted for SMEs, meaning that banks have
then again substituted large firm loans to SME loans in their portfolios.
2.3 Forward guidance
The central bank combines other monetary policy measures with forward
guidance to strengthen the effect of the former. Forward guidance works
such that ECB gives a statement that they will, for example, continue asset
purchases and keep interest rates low for some period of time into the future.
The period can be announced to terminate at a specific date or once a goal,
such as target inflation, is met. Banks and households therefore know that
the credit conditions won’t change in the near future. As a result, banks
can set lower interest rates on long-term loans such as mortgages. Forward
guidance essentially changes expectations of banks and households, which
then determines the interest rates in the long run.
Forward guidance can however also have an adverse impact. It can occur
that the central bank has a more negative view on the state of the economy
than the general opinion. In that case the announcement of expansionary
monetary policy in the future will signal that the economy is doing worse
than expected and therefore have a negative impact on investments and other
real macroeconomic variables. This phenomena is known as Delphic forward
guidance. Campbell, Evans, Fisher, Justiniano, Calomiris, and Woodford
(2012) elaborate the topic further.6
6See also Jarocinski and Karadi (2018).
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2.4 Timeline of the combined measures
The asset-backed securities and third covered bond purchase programmes
were already in place in 2014, but majority of the combined asset purchases
were conducted from 2015 onward. At time when the public sector purchase
programme began in March 2015, the ECB’s Governing Council set average
monthly targets for the purchases. In line with the targets, the net amounts
averaged 60 billion euros monthly from March 2015 to March 2016.
In March 20167 the ECB announced a new fourfold extension of the un-
conventional policy measures. First, the monthly net purchases were in-
creased to 80 billion per month for the next 12-month period. Second, the
interest rate on the main refinancing operations was lowered by 5 basis points
to 0% and the rate on the deposit facility was lowered by 10 basis points to
-0.40%. Third, the corporate asset purchase programme began, providing
finance directly to non-financial corporations. Lastly, the second set of tar-
geted longer-term refinancing operations was launched. From April 2017 the
asset purchase target was set to 60 billion, in January 2018 to 30 billion and
finally to 15 billion from October 2018 to December 2018.
On September 12th, 2019 the ECB Governing Council announced addi-
tional measures. The rate on the deposit facility was lowered by an additional
10 basis points to -0.50 % and the interest rate on the main refinancing op-
erations was at 0%. The Governing Council stated that they expect the
policy rates to remain at their present or lower levels until inflation robustly
converges to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2%. Asset purchases
were restarted at a monthly pace of 20 billion euros as from November 2019.
The Governing Council expects them too to run for as long as necessary to
reinforce the impact of its policy rates. The payments from maturing securi-
ties purchased under the programme will be reinvested until the policy rates
are raised or beyond that in order to maintain favorable credit conditions.
The conditions on the third targeted longer-term refinancing operations were
made more advantageous by lowering interest rates and increasing maturity
of the loans. As a final step, a part of banks’ holdings of excess liquidity will
7See ECB (2016) for the March 10, 2016 press release.
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Figure 1: Composite indicator of the cost of borrowing for non-financial
enterprises. The pale blue line is an indicator for Finland, whereas the black
line represent the euro area average. The figure is taken from the Statistical
Data Warehouse.
be exempt from the negative deposit facility rate.8 The aim of this exemption
is to support the banking sector in transmitting monetary policy objectives.
2.5 Empirical evidence
Our assumption is that the measures we went through above eased credit
conditions in the Europe and more importantly, in Finland. The composite
indicator of the cost of borrowing is based on bank interest rate statistics. It
measures the costs of new loans issued for non-financial corporations. Figure
1 shows the indicators for Finland and the euro area for the entire observation
period. The series for euro area and Finland behaved somewhat similarly be-
fore the 2007–2009 crisis, although the interest rates in Finland have been
below the euro area average throughout. After peaking in October 2008 (be-
ing 5.74%) the interest rates plummeted by nearly four percentage points by
May 2010 (being 1.76%). From there began an increase in costs of borrowing
as the Eurosystem drifted into the sovereign debt crisis.
The interest rates have been on a steady decline in the euro zone since
8See ECB (2019) for the September, 12 2019 press release.
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the beginning of 2014, that is for six years now. A possible explanations
for the decline is the grand action taken to boost financial markets after
the sovereign debt crisis. The average cost of borrowing for non-financial
corporations has declined well over the decline in monetary policy reference
rates. Therefore, it is likely that the asset purchases played a significant role.
The picture for Finland is not as clear. Non-financial corporations’ cost of
borrowing has even slightly grown from January 2016 onward after decreasing
at a slower pace than the euro zone. It was above the euro area average in
July 2016, for the first time since the beginning of the span of the data in
2003. The reason behind this could be that the sovereign debt crisis did not
hit Finnish banks particularly hard and therefore some of the measures taken
have effectively narrowed the wedge between conditions in healthy and the
stressed economies. The interest rates in Finland are nevertheless close to
an all-time low and much lower than before the crash of 2008. Evidence on
cost of borrowing for non-financial firms after the crises is thus established,
but what about the terms?
The euro area bank lending survey offers information on the conditions
at which banks lend money. It helps to distinguish supply and demand of
credit, which simple measures of the realized lending rates are unable to do.
The survey is addressed four times a year to a representative sample of banks
operating in the euro area. The survey is divided into three loan categories,
where loans to enterprises is listed as one. The participants are asked to
describe changes in standards of approving loans, terms and conditions on
new loans, factors affecting the supply of loans, loan demand and the share
of rejections on a five-point scale. The questions are qualitative and usually
formulated as experienced tightening/easing. The survey is commonly used
in studying the impact of monetary policy on SMEs, because in the survey,
SMEs are separated from the large. Therefore it is possible get evidence on
the credit conditions of small and medium-sized firms and compare them to
those of large enterprises. The results for Finland are however confidential
and therefore the survey does not help us in determining the supply of credit
to small and medium-sized enterprises in Finland.
The survey on access to finance of enterprises (SAFE) provides evidence
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Figure 2: Survey on the access to finance of enterprises: financial gap, small
and medium-sized enterprises. The blue line is an indicator for Finland,
whereas the orange line represent the euro area average. The figure is taken
from the Statistical Data Warehouse.
from the firm side. The sample covers firms of all sizes and across branches
of economic activity as well as other dimensions in a balanced manner. Part
of the survey is run by the European Central Bank biannually and a more
comprehensive selection of questions once a year. Similarly to the bank
lending survey, the results are broken down by firm size. The data for Finland
is mostly confidential, expect for a measure for experienced financial gap of
SMEs. Figure 2 presents the series for Finland and the euro area. The values
are positive in case firms perceive that the wedge between their demanded
and received credit has widened. Conversely, negative values state that SMEs
experienced credit easing compared to the previous period. The beginning
of the period is interesting, as there we can see that credit conditions for
Finnish SMEs eased while the situation in Europe was on average completely
opposite. This difference might be due to differences in the supply or demand
side. It could be that in Finland aggregate demand diminished more than
supply of credit, and therefore it was easy for firms to get a loan. Another
option is that the supply of credit was higher in Finland than in the euro zone
on average, possibly due healthier banks. Both series show systematic easing
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of credit conditions from the second half of 2014 onward. Therefore we can
conclude that for one reason or another, the credit conditions of small and
medium-sized firms in Finland eased simultaneously with the unconventional
monetary policy measures taken by the European Central Bank.
3 Literature
Our work is related to a compact literature on heterogeneous behaviour of
firms of different size at business cycle frequencies. More specifically, most
of these papers look at the impact of monetary policy on firms of different
size. The literature is concentrated on a period before the introduction of
unconventional monetary policy or even the euro zone and therefore we have
to look elsewhere in order to study the impact of unconventional monetary
policy. The strand of literature focusing on unconventional measures is quite
recent and consensus is yet to be found. Therefore we do an overview of
the empirical strategies used. A number of papers look at the impact of
unconventional monetary policy on SMEs and we naturally go through them
in detail. To our knowledge, none however consider the possible asymmetries
between the responses of firms of different size to unconventional measures.
3.1 SMEs and the business cycle
There are a number of possible explanations to why small firms might per-
form differently at business cycle frequencies compared to large. One rather
intuitive narrative is that small firms act as subcontractors to larger firms.
At downturns the sales of small firms decline more quickly compared to large,
because large firms adjust their output first by reducing orders from small
firms. In upturns, the sales of small firms with respect to large increase
again. Whether the relation would turn to favor small firms depends on if we
assume that large firms need to start subcontracting again before adjusting
their own output.
Another possible explanation is that firms of different size are dispropor-
tionately represented in different industries. Thus the differences in cycli-
15
cality between industries rather than firm size is expected to drive the out-
comes. Whether export-driven industries recover more quickly would depend
on whether the upturn in national economy is due to improvements in the
global state of the economy or domestic demand. The third, and in our
mind, the most plausible explanation is asymmetrical access to credit, which
impairs small firms especially at economic slumps and benefits them in the
recovery periods. We address all these options.
An influential paper by Bernanke et al. (1994) formalizes the theory that
small and medium-sized firms perform differently at business cycle frequen-
cies due to asymmetries in access to credit. They introduce the concept of
a financial accelerator. The term aims at describing a phenomena where a
rather small shock can have a large effect on the business cycle. The effect
is transmitted through an asymmetrical change in lending in the economy.
Bernanke et al. (1994) suggest that worsening credit conditions caused
by an adverse shock hit those with high agency costs more due to flight
to quality. In other words, at the verge of a recession, investors shift their
money away from risky investments into more secure ones. Bernanke et al.
(1994) argue that small firms, alongside with consumers, are, on average,
the ones who face substantial agency costs of borrowing. This is due to
information costs of external finance. There is less information available on
small operators and getting access to that information is costly with respect
to the amount of debt they demand. This is not the case for listed companies.
At an economic downturn, the probability of default increases, which further
increases the agency costs of intermediated credit. Large firms face smaller
agency costs and thus have better access to external credit but at the same
time they have access to more internal debt and thus are less affected by
credit tightening to begin with. The worsening of access to credit of small
firms at times where they have a higher need for it amplifies the effect of the
of the original shock.
The theory by Bernanke et al. (1994) suggests that those with higher
agency costs are forced to reduce their output earlier and more than the
rest. It also suggests that the same firms would be the first to recover at
an economic upturn. Thus the paper lends evidence to a hypothesis that
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smaller firms (where firm size is a proxy for credit constrainment) are more
procyclical in that they suffer more at economic downturns but on the other
hand might recover quicker at upturns.
As empirical evidence in support of the theory of monetary policy shock
propagation through credit market asymmetries, a seminal paper by Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) analyzes the responses of small and large manufactur-
ing firms to changes in monetary policy. They use periods of tight credit
identified from historical records by Romer and Romer (1989). Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) argue that if credit market frictions play a role, there should
be differences in the business cycle behaviour of firms, depending on their
access to credit. Difference in access to external finance is hard to measure
and therefore Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use firm size as a proxy in line with
Bernanke et al. (1994). They argue that size is an adequate proxy, because
size is correlated with the form of external finance the firm primarily uses.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that in their data set, small firms rely more
heavily on information-intensive financing, such as bank loans. Additionally,
the difference is even more pronounced when it comes to short-term bank
loans, the supply of which likely fluctuates with the economy.
For our purposes using size as a proxy is unambiguously a positive thing,
as we look at the issue from the viewpoint of data collection. In a way, we
need not know whether or not firms on different size perform in a way they
do due to financial reasons. We are only interested in the explaining the
situation where differences might occur and their magnitude.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) study sales as opposed to output due to
practical reasons. They use a quarterly data from the manufacturing sec-
tor (Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations), which is
disaggregated by firm size in terms of gross nominal assets. The size classi-
fication is in nominal terms, which, coupled with inflation, introduces bias
towards larger firms over time. To overcome the bias, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) reaggregate the data into two quarterly growth series in terms of an-
other measure of size, sales. The growth rate of small firms considers firms
under the thirtieth percentile cutoff each period, whereas the rest are con-
sidered large. Ultimately, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) end up with series for
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the growth rates of large and small firms in the manufacturing sector. Their
graphical analysis shows that the sales of small firms decline with respect to
large firms at times of tight credit and, more often than not, in recessions.
However, the pattern in recessions is not very discernible.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) estimate a simple vector autoregressive model
(VAR) for small and large firms and a dummy for Romer-Romer periods of
tights credit. The impulse responses show that a Romer-Romer date has a
much larger effect on small firms than large. The difference in the drops
of sales is statistically significant after three quarters, peaks at 10 quarters
(being 12 %) and persists at around 10 % even after 16 quarters.
Using federal funds rate as a proxy for monetary policy as opposed to
the Romer-Romer dates creates insignificant impulse responses. Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) argue that this is due to asymmetry in the monetary policy
propagation mechanisms. At bad times, more small firms are effected by
credit tightening, because their balance sheets are weak to begin with. The
supply of debt for small, credit constrained firms falls consistently when there
is a credit tightening, but demand significantly rises only when the economy
is in a slump and firms require extra credit to keep their operations running.
Romer-Romer dates tend to occur before cyclical downturns, and thus they
capture only the intensive, negative effects.
Kudlyak and Sánchez (2017) revisit the work of Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) and extend it to the economic crisis of 2007–2009. Kudlyak and
Sánchez (2017) find that after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008, short-term debt and sales of large firms declined much more than those
of small firms, which is highly in contrast with the findings of Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) on the correlation of tight money periods and firm size.
Kudlyak and Sánchez (2017) show that their findings are however in line
with Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) in small and large firms’ behavior during
previous recessions (dated by National Bureau of Economic Research NBER).
Thus it might be that the period of economic turmoil after the collapse of the
Lehman Brothers was primarily not a period of tight credit. It could instead
be that other shocks, such as a negative aggregate demand shock due to
high level of uncertainty, were more significant in explaining the variance of
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macroeconomic variables.
Abo-Zaid and Zervou (2020) build a model that produces outcomes in
line with the findings of Kudlyak and Sánchez (2017) as well as those of
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), given that we believe the 2007–2009 crisis not
to be a period that is first and foremost characterized by an adverse monetary
policy shock. Abo-Zaid and Zervou (2020) aim at explaining difference in
the employment behaviour of heterogeneous firms. Abo-Zaid and Zervou
(2020) divide firms to two groups; one is dependent on external debt in
order to operate and the other one is independent of it. Therefore, the
cost of finance drives differences between the two groups. Abo-Zaid and
Zervou (2020) deduct that expansionary monetary policy shocks benefit the
dependent firms, shifting employment to their end. It is reasonable to think
the same is true for output as well. This is in line with the work on periods
of tight credit by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
Abo-Zaid and Zervou (2020) propose that productivity shocks, on the
other hand, benefit independent firms more. The reasoning is that a positive
productivity shock improves the performance of all types of firms, but that
it also consequently increases interest rate. The increase is an extra cost
to the dependent firms and thus in the end they benefit less from the rise
in productivity. Following the inference one step further, dependent firms
also suffer less from contractionary productivity shocks, because the shock
simultaneously lowers the interest rate and thus cost of external finance.
The same idea holds for any type of shock that affects aggregate output
but doesn’t reduce access to credit proportionally. Thus it could be used to
explain the better performance of small firms as suggested by Kudlyak and
Sánchez (2017). To sum up, the framework by Abo-Zaid and Zervou (2020)
suggests, that the type of shock behind a business cycle turn plays a major
role in what to expect from the outcome from heterogeneous firms.
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2013) concentrate on the sales of small and
large firms at business cycle contractions, and provide empirical evidence in
line with the idea that the underlying shock rather than the business cycle
turn determines the response of heterogeneous firms. Chari et al. (2013)
consider several types of shocks underlying business cycle turns, similarly to
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Abo-Zaid and Zervou (2020). Chari et al. (2013) are able to reproduce the re-
sults by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) around tight credit dates. Additionally,
they find the difference between sales of large and small firms insignificant
after NBER-dated recessions. There are two possible interpretations. First,
it could be that small firms react more strongly to monetary policy shocks,
as was first pointed out by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), but that there is no
difference when it comes to aggregate shocks that actually cause recessions.
Second, it could be that some recessions were mainly caused by monetary
policy shocks and the rest by some other type of shock and the different re-
sponses by firm size cancel each other out when focusing on recessions. The
second explanation is in line with the model by Abo-Zaid and Zervou (2020).
Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) extend the work initiated
by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and include firm age in their analysis of
heterogeneous firms’ reaction to business cycles. Firm age is often thought
to be an additional proxy for access to credit due to information costs to
external credit (see for example Hadlock and Pierce (2010)). Firm age could
potentially have additional explanatory power on information asymmetries
causing the costs. Bank can have only limited amount of information on the
state of a new firm and thus would first cut on these risky loans at times
of credit crunch, which is in line with the theory by Bernanke et al. (1994).
Fort et al. (2013) find evidence in support of the fact that young firms differ
from large in their performance due to restricted access to credit. Thus they
contribute to the possible channels in which firm heterogeneity and finance
are tied together. As previously stated, we are only interesting in how firm
size correlates with financial conditions. Therefore we leave the emphasis on
firm age for further research.
Finally, evidence in line with Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and the fi-
nancial explanation is again provided by Ehrmann (2005). He studies the
sensitivity of small firms to monetary policy shocks. Ehrmann (2005) com-
bines qualitative survey data with macroeconomic analysis. He uses data
that includes also the smallest firms with 1-49 employees and observes them
at a monthly frequency. The survey consists of questions about the firms
perception of the prevalent business conditions as well as demand situation.
20
Ehrmann (2005) looks at the impact of monetary policy on the survey an-
swers of firms of different size. He includes data from 1981 onward and, in
order to avoid a structural break, restricts it to end at the introduction of the
euro. The survey data used by Ehrmann (2005) is included in the Ifo Busi-
ness Climate Index, which is an indicator widely used in German business
cycle analysis. This gives credibility to the results.
Ehrmann (2005) uses a structural vector autoregressive model with four
variables: growth rate of M3 money, reported business conditions of a size
class, three-month money market rate and producer price inflation. Ehrmann
(2005) uses producer prices rather than consumer prices for Germany specific
reasons. He finds that contractionary monetary policy leads to distributional
effects. The shock has a negative impact on the business conditions of firms
of all size, but the impact is more pronounced in smaller size classes. The im-
pact increases monotonically when moving from the largest size class to the
smallest. The results are however significant only after around 25 months,
therefore indicating that the transmission of monetary policy onto the busi-
ness conditions of firms is a slow process.
Ehrmann (2005) discusses the aforementioned possibility of subcontract-
ing driving the asymmetry. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) rule out subcontract-
ing by analyzing inventories in addition to sales. Ehrmann (2005) takes a
different approach and looks at firms’ reported demand status. Subcontract-
ing should be reflected in the demand status of firms. Thus, when controlled
for, demand status should take care of the identification. The same strategy
holds for industry-specific demand, which could cause bias in the case that
small firms were disproportionally represented in more cyclical industries.
Controlling for demand effects ensures that the findings are driven by the
supply size, that is by the supply of credit.
The results by Ehrmann (2005) can however only be seen as indicative
for our purposes, because they are estimated using data from an era before
the euro. Additionally, the identified shock is a conventional monetary policy
shock, which only impacts the policy rate and the amount of money in the
economy. The data Ehrmann (2005) uses is also survey data and therefore
discrete. This might complicate the results as a lot of different scenarios can
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fit under an answer such as “At present, we consider our business conditions
to be i) good”. On the one end there are firms that get by well enough not to
experience acute distress about their business conditions. At the other end of
the spectrum are start-ups that have experienced skyrocketing growth. Both
firms are likely to answer in the same way, as "good" is the most positive
option in the survey. Similarly, at economic downturns, the transition down
a three-step scale might take a long time and therefore delay the detection
of the turn.
We have thus far introduced theory and evidence in favor of financial
reasons creating asymmetries in the performance of heterogeneous firms at
business cycle frequencies. We briefly present a few papers that support
alternative approaches. It is however worth noting that majority of the pa-
pers covered so far have controlled for demand effects and thus aren’t per se
challenged by these alternative views.
An influential paper by Gabaix (2011) introduces reversed causality from
firms to the business cycle. He argues that an idiosyncratic, that is, firm
specific shock to a large, internationally connected firm can create an ag-
gregate shock that eventually affects the whole business cycle. As such, the
work by Gabaix (2011) could be evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the
driving force of asymmetrical cyclical behaviour of firms of different size is
international connectedness. In Gabaix (2011), large firms operate on more
international industries. Then again, the causality runs from large, multina-
tional firms to the business cycle, and therefore does not tell much about the
response of small firms.
di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2017) introduce further evidence
from France. In the footsteps of Gabaix (2011), they study the impact of
the 100 largest firms in France on business cycle fluctuation. They propose
that the largest firms account for such a major part of the aggregate output
in France and are additionally so highly internationally connected that firm
specific shocks can affect the business cycle. On the other hand, based on
the data used in Cravino and Levchenko (2016), the share of multinational
affiliates in total revenue in Finland is among the lowest in Europe (around 18
% compared to approximately 27 % in Sweden and 58 % in the Netherlands).
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Therefore international connectedness probably does not play that big of a
role in shock transmission in Finland.
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) in turn study the employment be-
haviour of large and small firms at business cycle frequencies. Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay (2012) find a negative correlation between the job creation rate
of large companies and aggregate unemployment. They use data that spans
several (including European) countries, multiple sectors and goes back as far
as 1978. The corresponding correlation is smaller the smaller the firm (mea-
sured in number of employees). The results suggest that large firms’ employ
more people at times of low unemployment and conversely lay people off
when unemployment is above trend. Therefore Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
(2012) conclude that large firms are more procyclical in their employment
behavior. Fornaro and Luomaranta (2015) use firm-level monthly data from
January 1998 to September 2014 to confirm the findings of Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay (2012) in Finland for all other sectors except public.
Both the results by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) and Fornaro and
Luomaranta (2015) are somewhat in contrast with those of Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994). Neither Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) nor Fornaro
and Luomaranta (2015) present any hypotheses on the the driving forces
behind the results. They are nevertheless in contrast with the empirical
evidence found in relation to financial reasons and therefore can be seen as
evidence for alternative explanations for the asymmetry. As Fornaro and Lu-
omaranta (2015) finds the procyclicality of large firm employment to hold on
all periods, the results point towards the subcontracting assumption. Then
again the work of Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) is set in a different
time to Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), and it is possible that the pattern of
the economy has fundamentally changed. It could for example be that there
are forces at play behind the more current shocks, as was also proposed by
Kudlyak and Sánchez (2017). It could also be that employment behaviour
differs significantly from that of firms’ turnover in terms of timing.
Finally, Fornaro and Luomaranta (2017) present empirical evidence from
Finland related to the hypothesis that small firms act as subcontractors to
large companies. They study the role of dependencies in productivity of
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small and medium enterprises, i.e. does being owned by a mother company
affect the productivity of said firms. Fornaro and Luomaranta (2017) make
two interesting observations for our purposes. First, the productivity of
dependent firms rises when one extends her analysis from micro to small and
small and medium-sized enterprises. Second, the dependent to independent
employment ratio also rises when moving from the smallest firms to SMEs.
Therefore, dependent firms tend to be bigger and the bigger dependent firms
tend to be more productive.
It is less than clear whether being owned by a mother company causes
a firm to act as a subcontractor. If that was the case however, the analysis
of Fornaro and Luomaranta (2017) would suggest that medium-sized rather
than small firms act as subcontractors. Therefore subcontracting likely does
not explain the good performance of small Finnish firms after the twin crisis.
3.2 Studying the impact of unconventional monetary
policy
A key question in studying the impact of a policy is how the impact can be
isolated from other forces at play over the same period. When looking at the
transmission of monetary policy, one has to be able to separate supply and
demand effects. It could be that expansionary monetary policy coincides with
rising aggregate demand and therefore an increase in non-financial sector
loans or, say, GDP can be explained through demand rather than supply
effects. The impact of unconventional monetary policy has mainly been
investigated by two approaches: event studies using qualitative micro data
or structural vector autoregressions, where the shock is identified either by
sign and/or zero restriction or external instruments.
3.2.1 Event studies
Ferrando, Popov, and Udell (2019) study the impact of unconventional mon-
etary policy on SMEs in the euro zone. More specifically, they study the
effect of the outright monetary transactions program, that is the purchases
of bonds issued by member states, initiated by Mario Draghi’s July 2012
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declaration to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro. More specifically,
Ferrando et al. (2019) look at the impact of the declaration itself, as the
program was never implemented. The paper uses micro level data from the
survey on the access to finance of enterprises, which was introduced in sec-
tion 2.5. The SAFE data looks at access to credit from the perspective of
the firms. Ferrando et al. (2019) find that after the announcement of the
program, the credit conditions of small firms improved instantaneously.
Ferrando et al. (2019) aim at identifying the impact of the outright mon-
etary transaction announcement solely on the supply side. Therefore they
control for country-sector-time fixed effect, to avoid identifying local demand
shocks instead. Ferrando et al. (2019) explain that financial markets reacted
to the announcement of the program by lowering interest rates and capital
started to flow back to the stressed Southern European countries, even as the
ECB did not purchase any bonds through the outright monetary transaction
program.
The paper combines the firm-level survey with a data set containing infor-
mation about bank exposure to sovereign debt and another with bank-firm
relationship. As a result they have a data set that is helpful in identifying
the entire transmission mechanism of the program, from the impact of the
announcement on banks and further how that impact manifests onto firms.
Their hypothesis is that the banks that had a larger balance sheet exposure
to risky sovereign debt benefited the most from the program. Ferrando et al.
(2019) consequently assume that the lending conditions of firms with credit
relationship to those banks eased.
Ferrando et al. (2019) create a dummy variable for credit constraint as
their main dependent variable. The variable is defined such that it equals one
for a firm that has experienced one or more condition for credit constraint
in the past six months. It could be that the firm’s application for a bank
loan was denied or that the firm received less than 75% of the loan amount
it requested. Alternatively the firm might have refused a loan offer because
the rate was too high or did not apply due to fear of rejection. Based on
these qualifications, Ferrando et al. (2019) define 17.9% of the 2,628 firms
in the data set to be credit constrained. They use a difference-in-difference
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strategy to conclude that the probability that a firm would be credit con-
strained declined significantly more after the outright monetary transaction
announcement for firms borrowing from banks with a significant exposure to
risky sovereign debt.
Ferrando et al. (2019) do not find consistent evidence on SMEs improved
access to credit having resulted in increased innovation. To our mind, it
seems somewhat implausible to assume that firms would, during a financial
crisis, grant for a loan in order to push new products into the market. It is
more likely that the credit is used to keep operations running at a difficult
time. One way would be to use credit to maintain production and accumulate
inventory. The idea is to smooth production over fluctuations in aggregate
demand, similarly to what was assumed in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
Ferrando et al. (2019) find that the firms which experienced eased credit
conditions increased their cash flow and invested in capital more compared
to the rest.
The outright monetary transactions program was a tool that was used
in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis. Therefore its main objective was
to bring the Eurosystem back from a verge of collapsing rather than to ease
credit conditions to boost the economy. It is, in addition, likely that the
impact of the program was largest in Southern Europe and Ireland. That is
to say, the countries deepest into the crisis benefited the most. We there-
fore cannot generalize the results found by Ferrando et al. (2019) to hold
in the aftermath of the crisis or in Finland. That is especially so since the
authors were not able to recover bank-firm relationships in Finland using
the aforementioned data sets. The paper nevertheless lends evidence to our
hypothesis that unconventional monetary policy can potentially ease credit
conditions significantly in the non-financial sector. Additionally, the easing
transmits to real variables concerning the firms, though with a significant
lag. Ferrando et al. (2019) do not, on the other hand, compare their results
on the real effects on SMEs with similar measures on large firms. Therefore
we cannot rule out that the results could have been symmetrical among firms
of all sizes.
Paludkiewicz (2018) states that unconventional monetary policy mea-
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sures seem to have decreased the yields of bonds more than interest rates
on new loans issued in Germany. As a result, she studies whether that has
encouraged banks to substitute securities for loans to non-financial firms.
More specifically, Paludkiewicz (2018) analyzes the impact of ECB’s asset
purchase programme using a difference-in-difference setup and finds that the
banks that see a decline in the yield they receive from securities increase their
lending to the non-financial sector more strongly relative to others. That is
to say, banks rebalance their portfolios as a response to the monetary policy
measures. The effect strengthens when banks face many investment deci-
sions, i.e. when they have many maturing securities in their portfolio.
Paludkiewicz (2018) finds no evidence that the rebalancing would be more
pronounced in weakly capitalized banks. This notion is interesting for our
purposes. Ferrando et al. (2019) found evidence that the outright monetary
transactions program in 2012 eased credit conditions in the countries under
most stress during the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. The banks that
were most exposed to the risky sovereign debt before the program were among
those who benefited most from it. The evidence found by Paludkiewicz
(2018), on the other hand concludes that the asset purchase programme
had a symmetrical impact on banks irrespective of their financial situation.
It is thus more plausible to assume that the effect found by Paludkiewicz
(2018) can be generalized to the Finnish context, unlike those of Ferrando
et al. (2019).
Paludkiewicz (2018) assesses the usual problem of separating supply and
demand effects by using the heterogeneousness of banks in terms of reinvest-
ment decisions. Banks with more maturing securities were more active in
substituting bonds for non-financial loans, which reasserts that the impact
is supply-driven. The finding of Paludkiewicz (2018) further strengthens our
belief that unconventional monetary policy, in this case the asset purchases,
have increased lending to the non-financial sector.
Ertan et al. (2020), on the other hand, study the impact of the corporate
sector asset purchase programme. They find that the programme has encour-
aged large firms to borrow directly from the market instead of banks. Ertan
et al. (2020) imply that as large firms can rely more on bond financing due
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to the corporate sector purchase programme, their demand for bank loans
decreases. That frees up resources in banks that can be used to finance other
targets. Ertan et al. (2020) investigate whether small and medium-sized firms
provide a natural substitute for the lost large firm debt and therefore focus
on the impact of the purchases on small and medium-sized firms.
Ertan et al. (2020) build a similar data set to that of Ferrando et al. (2019)
in order to separate the supply effects of the programme from other potential
explanations. That is, they use firm-level data on purchases conducted under
the corporate sector asset purchase programme and combine it with bank-
level data on balance sheet composition. With this combination Ertan et al.
(2020) are able to identify the banks that had customers included in the
purchases and find that those banks increased loans to SMEs by 12 percent.
It could however be that demand effects explain the increased lending and
therefore further data is needed to deduct causality. Therefore Ertan et al.
(2020) examine the survey on access to credit data on the firms within the
affected industry-region cohorts (due to lack of exact firm-level data). They
find that the SMEs in those industries and countries that were exposed to
corporate sector purchases received more loans conditional on applying them.
That is, their application were less often rejected and they more often were
granted the full amount they applied for. In addition, the exposed firms paid,
on average, lower interest rates.
Ertan et al. (2020) also study the impact on real economy and find that
the SMEs that benefited from the programme used the extra credit for in-
vestments and hiring additional staff. The results suggest that the increased
lending to SMEs has a real impact in that the excess finance is not used for,
for example, paying back existing loans. Deducting one step further, we can
also think that this might manifest into the macroeconomy, depending on the
magnitude of the measures. Ertan et al. (2020) do not, similarly to Ferrando
et al. (2019) and Paludkiewicz (2018), compare their results to large firms.
Event studies are an appealing option when one has access to detailed
micro data on the behaviour of banks or firms prior to and after the policy
change. For example the difference-in-difference strategy can be used to
uncover causal relationship from the policy measure onto an economic agent,
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given the usual conditions of a credible control group with a parallel pre-
event trend and no other events distorting the results. However, an event
study is not an option for us. Even though we have access to a mountain
of firm-level data about the use of external debt and so forth, we cannot
distinguish supply and demand effects from one another based on it. The
amount of external debt a firm has does not tell much about how much debt
the firms wishes to attain. What we would need is data from surveys such
as the bank lending survey or the survey on access to finance of enterprises.
Unfortunately, as we went through in section 2.5, the vast majority of data
for Finland on both of the surveys is confidential and therefore inaccessible.
3.2.2 Identification with sign and/or zero restrictions
Boeckx et al. (2017) study the impact of an expansion in the European Cen-
tral Bank’s balance sheet. Traditionally monetary policy shocks have been
identified through a change in the policy rates. This is natural as conven-
tional monetary policy has mostly consisted of adjusting said rates. The
effect of measures that expand the central banks balance sheet is studied less
and Boeckx et al. (2017) contribute to that strand of literature. The Eu-
ropean Central Bank has introduced many unconventional monetary policy
measures that expand their balance sheet, such as the targeted longer-term
refinancing operations and asset purchase programmes. Boeckx et al. (2017)
however argue that due to anticipation, their model is not suitable for iden-
tifying the effects of the asset purchase programs. Therefore they limit their
sample to run from from the start of the crisis (and the unconventional mea-
sures) in January 2007 until the beginning of the expanded asset purchase
program in December 2014.
The anticipation effect can be dealt with by substituting the size of the
balance sheet with announcement of purchases that increase the balance
sheet. We however note that especially in the case of the targeted longer-
term asset purchase programs, majority of the impact likely occurs when
the purchases are actually implemented, rather than announced. The rea-
soning is that as the refinancing operations are conditional on the amount
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banks increase their lending to the non-financial sector, it is wise to post-
pone applicable lending until the program is in place. Therefore considering
announced accumulation of the balance sheet instead of the actual size might
force us to exclude the impact of the refinancing operations.
Boeckx et al. (2017) find results similar to those typically associated with
shocks to the interest rate. Expansion in total assets leads to a temporary
rise in output and prices in the euro area. Boeckx et al. (2017) further study
the transmission mechanisms of the shock by adding a number of financial
variables into the SVAR model. They find that a rise in the size of the ECB’s
balance sheet increases bank lending to both firms and households. The
effects on output vary by country. Boeckx et al. (2017) find that output grew
least in the countries deepest in the financial countries, such as Greece and
Portugal. Health of the banking sector could, according to the authors, play
a key role. It is quite intuitive as banks have a large role in the transmission
of monetary policy onto the non-financial sector. Finland is likely to be in
the group of countries with a better record on solvency given it’s healthy
banking sector. Thus the bank-lending channel could be stronger in Finland.
Due to the short sample period the authors argue that the results likely
cannot be extrapolated to normal times, when the euro area is not under
stress. The policy rates set by European Central Bank have then again
stayed at or below zero for several years and thus it could be concluded that
it is the new normal.9 In the estimation results of Boeckx et al. (2017), a
shock to the balance sheet did create a tightening of the policy rate after a
couple of months, stemming from the fact that the central bank adjusted the
interest rate at the earlier stages of the sample period. Thus the effect on
prices and output of a balance sheet shock should be greater on these more
recent times when policy rates have not risen.
Hesse et al. (2018) study the macroeconomic effects of asset purchases
using a Bayesian vector autoregressive model. Their focus is on the US and
UK and on the question whether the impact of the unconventional measures
has diminished over time. Hesse et al. (2018) hypothesize that the effect of
9This is especially true as in the time of writing in March 2020 there is again pressure
to lower the rates.
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monetary policy is likely stronger during times of severe economic distress.
That is likely the case for transmission into the credit conditions of SMEs
as well. It is therefore interesting to study the impact of unconventional
monetary policy from right after the sovereign debt crisis up until now, since
the period we are interested in cannot be described as an economic slump.
Our work therefore contributes to that of Hesse et al. (2018).
Hesse et al. (2018) use a model with five variables: GDP, CPI, the cumu-
lative sum of asset purchase announcements, the yield on government bonds
and the real stock price index. The cumulative asset purchase announce-
ments is what they use as the policy instrument. The model by Hesse et al.
(2018) therefore studies the impact of the announcement of the policy rather
than the implementation, as Boeckx et al. (2017) did. The results show that
the earlier asset purchases in the US and UK had a significant positive im-
pact on real GDP and prices. The later purchases however have not been as
efficient in boosting real economy.
The approach of Hesse et al. (2018) could be directly applied to our
benchmark model by Boeckx et al. (2017). One would simply need to switch
the size of the balance sheet to the cumulative asset purchase announcement.
The shock is however identified in Hesse et al. (2018) also by increasing real
stock prices and reducing bond yields. In the European context bond yield
is likely not a good variable. Stock prices are also hard to include as they
would be a collection of values of different countries at potentially very varied
economic states. Hesse et al. (2018) use zero restrictions on GDP and prices
similarly to Boeckx et al. (2017). The sign restrictions on the bond yield and
on stock prices are imposed instantaneously and on the following month,
while the sign restrictions for the asset purchase announcement series are
imposed on impact and the following five months. The estimation procedure
is the same as in Boeckx et al. (2017) where a Bayesian approach with a
Normal-Wishart prior is taken.
As a robustness check, Hesse et al. (2018) try an alternative identification
procedure in which the shock is restricted based on the financial impact of the
balance sheet innovation, but excluding the balance sheet. The identifying
restrictions are kept the same. The aim of this approach is to take care of the
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anticipation effect. Hesse et al. (2018) infer that the impact of the purchases
might diminish over time due to the fact that the market can later anticipate
them. Therefore the element of surprise is smaller and some of the impact of
the announcement occurs beforehand. This strategy produces results similar
to those found with the benchmark model. The authors argue that while
ruling out anticipation effects, this strategy mixes the results with those of
forward guidance. While Hesse et al. (2018) are interested in especially the
impact of asset purchases, we are not as worried in the identifications of two
unconventional monetary policy shocks simultaneously.
Weale and Wieladek (2016) also use a Bayesian VAR in order to study the
impact of announcements of asset purchases in the United Kingdom and the
United States. They use a monthly data that only spans a period when asset
purchases were in the repertory of the central banks in question. Weale and
Wieladek (2016) use altogether four identification approaches for robustness.
These include recursive zero restrictions, pure sign restrictions, combination
of zero and sign restrictions and finally, variance decomposition restrictions.
Based on eyeballing, all the four procedures seem to identify the same shock.
This is interesting, especially as Weale and Wieladek (2016) use an extremely
short time period of less than four years. The recursive structure is somewhat
an exception, probably due to the fact that it is hardly supported by theory.
In contrast to Boeckx et al. (2017) and Hesse et al. (2018), the shock is, in the
pure sign restriction approach, identified such that the reactions of GDP and
prices are left unrestricted. Weale and Wieladek (2016) follow Uhlig (2005)
in using a non-informative Normal-Wishart prior, similarly as was done in
Boeckx et al. (2017) and Hesse et al. (2018).
Weale and Wieladek (2016) look at the impact of announced purchases
after the active period of the crisis. Therefore their results, although not con-
cerning the euro area, are especially interesting for us. Weale and Wieladek
(2016) find that an asset purchase announcement shock worth one percent
of GDP leads to a peak impact of 0.62% and 0.25% of GDP in the US and
UK, respectively. The impact on prices is similarly stronger in the United
States, where it peaks at 0.58% compared to the 0.32% in the UK. Thus the
impact of announced asset purchases differs from country to country. The
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impacts within the euro system can be expected to be even more heteroge-
neous, as monetary policy is shared while country-specific qualities are not.
A further element of surprise is whether and how the macroeconomic effects
are forwarded into firm-level.
Izquierdo, Muñoz, Rubio, and Ulloa (2017) study the impact of a sup-
porting factor introduced with Basel III10 on Spanish GDP. The transition
from Basel II to Basel III was expected to reduce loans to SMEs due to new
liquidity ratio requirements. To avoid that from happening, the requirements
were augmented with a supporting factor on loans to small and medium-sized
enterprises. As a result, banks were allowed to increase their share of ’risky’
SME loans and thus continue supplying them. Izquierdo et al. (2017) exam-
ine the effect of the supporting factor with a structural vector autoregression
model. They use a combination of zero and sign restrictions to to separate
the impact of shocks in the credit market from other macroeconomic shocks.
To disentangle supply of credit from demand, the model is identified
such that a positive supply shock decreases the banking interest rate spread
(difference between the yield of banking bond compared to others of similar
maturity) and an innovation in demand in turn increases it. A positive shock
in both supply or demand of credit increases the flow of credit. Neither is
assumed to have an impact on short-term interest rate of the euro zone GDP.
The introduction of the supporting factor is characterized as a credit supply
shock. It’s impact on the Spanish annual GDP is positive and statistically
significant for 2014, and positive but insignificant for 2015 and 2016. The
point estimates are 0.28, 0.24 and 0.24, respectively. These results assess
the impact of policies targeted directly at increasing lending to small and
medium-sized enterprises on the macroeconomy. Izquierdo et al. (2017) how-
ever do not study the real impact on the affected firms. Therefore they do
not directly lend evidence to our hypothesis that performance of small firms
is the driving force of the positive impact on the macroeconomy.
10Basel III is an international regulatory contract that introduced a set of improvements
to the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector.
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3.2.3 Identification with external instruments
Altavilla, Brugnolini, Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa (2019) use factor anal-
ysis as they study the effect of unconventional monetary policy through the
yield curve. Altavilla et al. (2019) use press release data to identify shocks
related to policy target, policy timing, forward guidance and quantitative
easing. The paper uses a very small window of 10 minutes to study the im-
pact in order to distinguish the surprises that stem from press releases on
one hand and press conferences on the other. According to the strategy of
Altavilla et al. (2019), the press release causes a surprise in the target of mon-
etary policy but does not provide other information. The press conference
later in the day can cause a timing surprise, where a policy change that was
expected to happen in the future ends up happening sooner. In this case, the
longer-term expectations stay the same. A forward guidance shock, on the
other hand, alters expectations in the longer run. Altavilla et al. (2019) focus
on the impact on financial markets. It is plausible to think that monetary
policy announcements transmit to the financial sector instantaneously, but a
similar effect on the real economy is less likely.
Altavilla et al. (2019) make interesting findings about the impact of dif-
ferent shocks on the yield curve. They show that the target shock has the
highest impact on the shortest maturities of the curve and diminishing ef-
fect elsewhere. The timing shock similarly has the largest impact on short
maturities, but the effect is hump shaped. Forward guidance has a hump
shaped impact as well, with most impact on maturities from two up to five
years. Finally, quantitative easing mostly affect the longer end of the yield
curve. These results show that the unconventional measures taken by the
ECB have been complements to each other in that they have impacted the
financial (and possibly real) market in different ways.
3.3 Transmission channels of monetary policy
In essence, conventional and unconventional monetary policy affect the econ-
omy in the same way. Expansionary monetary policy lowers interest rates,
which eases credit conditions, especially for small and medium-sized enter-
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prises. That in turn mitigates the impact of flight to quality introduced by
Bernanke et al. (1994). Firms respond to lower financial costs by increasing
investments. Cheaper loans also decrease the yield of saving with respect to
the cost of borrowing for households and make them substitute saving for
consuming. Expansionary monetary policy thus boosts private investments
in the economy through the interest rate channel.
Expansionary monetary policy also works through the exchange rate
channel. Lowered interest rates make the euro area less attractive in terms
of investments. The flow of money into Europe drains, which depreciates the
currency. The depreciation increases demand from outside the euro zone,
therefore boosting exports. When it comes to a single member state, the
impact is intensified by increased demand from inside the monetary union
as imports become more expensive. The boost in exports stimulates the
economies of the member states and further raises demand within the euro
zone as well.
Another way in which monetary policy benefits particularly smaller firms
is the balance sheet channel. Economic turmoil decreases the value of firms
balance sheet. Firms use the size of their balance sheet as collateral, that is
to account for the risk banks face when lending. Due to informational asym-
metries, smaller firms usually have to provide more collateral and therefore
they also benefit more from their balance sheets being appreciated as a re-
sult of expansionary monetary policy. Households similarly benefit from the
appreciation of the value of their wealth.
The appreciation also enhances further lending through the bank lending
channel. The lending ability of banks is tied to the value of their balance sheet
through liquidity ratio requirements. Ferrando et al. (2019) find evidence in
favor of the outright monetary transaction program impacting the economy
through the bank lending channel. The program was successful in lowering
the interest rates on government bonds issued by the countries deepest into
the sovereign debt crisis. Ferrando et al. (2019) use this information and show
that the banks with the highest balance sheet exposure to risky debt before
the program increased their lending the most, conditional on the demand.
Ferrando et al. (2019) additionally show that the bank lending channel was a
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key factor in easing credit conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises.
This is natural as smaller firms tend to rely on external debt.
Unconventional monetary policy has some additional transmission chan-
nels. One of them is the signalling channel. The European Central Bank
showed that they were willing to go the extra mile in order to meet their
mandate by introducing the asset purchases and refinancing operations. This
coupled up with forward guidance sent a strong signal which has altered
market expectations, that is increased them for inflation and lowered for
long-term interest rates.
In the portfolio rebalancing channel, the purchases conducted by the cen-
tral bank alter the spreads between bonds of different maturity. When the
European Central Bank buys bonds with a fairly long maturity, it decreases
their amount in the economy making them scarcer and thus more expensive.
The rise in price consequently decreases expected profits. The short-term
bond prices are tied by the zero lower bound and thus the risk premium to
fairly long bonds decreases. This in turn guides the investments to bonds
with even longer maturity, such as mortgages to households. The asset pur-
chases therefore flatten the yield curve and alter the portfolios of investors
in the market. Altavilla et al. (2019) study in detail the exact ways in which
monetary policy alters the yield curve.
The work by Paludkiewicz (2018) lends evidence to the portfolio rebal-
ancing channel. She uses a German data set to show that banks affected
by the declining yields increased lending to the non-financial sector. The
effect was more pronounced the more maturing securities and therefore rein-
vestment decisions the banks faced. It therefore seems that banks operate
on a yield goal and adjust their portfolio as a response to monetary policy
measures aimed at altering the yield curve.
The direct pass-through channel means that the unconventional mea-
sures have improved credit conditions in the private sector. The targeted
longer-term refinancing operations have increased supply of loans, which has
increased competition and lowered borrowing costs for non-financial corpo-
rations and households. Asset-backed securities and third covered bond pur-
chase programmes have also enhanced loan creation. The purchases have
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raised the prices of securities secured by for example house loans and the
bonds secured by mortgages and therefore lowered the interest rates paid
by households. The increased prices have encouraged banks to create more
loans in order to sell them forward, which has improved credit conditions in
private non-financial sector.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 SVAR model of unconventional monetary policy
Our empirical strategy builds on that of Boeckx et al. (2017). Our structural
vector autoregressive system can be written as
B0yt = B1yt−1 + · · ·+Bpyt−p + εt. (1)
The vector yt contains the endogenous variables, B0 is a matrix of the contem-
poraneous relationships between the variables and Bp is the corresponding
coefficient matrix at lag p. The constant term is omitted for convenience.
The term εt is a vector of serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic structural
shocks with zero mean. We additionally assume that
Σε = E(εtε′t) = IK . (2)
In other words, we assume that the K structural shocks are uncorrelated
with one another and normalize the variance of each shock to unity. The
endogenous variables are:
yt =

log(seasonally adjusted GDP)
log(seasonally adjusted consumer prices)
log(ECB’s total assets)
financial stress indicator CISS
EONIA-MRO spread
MRO rate

.
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By multiplying both sides of (1) with B−10 we get:
B−10 B0yt = B−10 B1yt−1 + · · ·+B−10 Bpyt−p +B−10 εt
yt = A1yt−1 + · · ·+ Apyt−p + ut or A(L)yt = ut. (3)
Equation (3) is the reduced form representation of equation (1), where A1 =
B−10 B1 and ut = B−10 εt. The latter part of equation (3) uses lag polynomial
notation. The reduced-form equation can be estimated by standard methods,
such as ordinary least squares. The reduced-form innovations ut are linear
combinations of the structural residuals εt and therefore serially uncorrelated
and exogenous. However, the variance-covariance matrix Σu is not diagonal
and thus we cannot directly interpret the shocks. Using the fact that ut =
B−10 εt, and standard matrix calculus rules, the variance-covariance matrix of
ut takes the form
Σu = E(utu′t)
= E(B−10 εt(B−10 εt)′)
= E(B−10 εtε′tB−1′0 ).
The matrix B−10 is non-stochastic and therefore we can take it out of the
expectation operation. We can further use the property in (2) to derive
Σu = B−10 E(εtε′t)B−1′0
= B−10 B−1′0 . (4)
Σu has K(K + 1)/2 parameters free for estimation, where K is again the
number of shocks in the system. B−10 , on the other hand, has K2 parameters.
Therefore we would need K2 − K(K + 1)/2 = K(K − 1)/2 restrictions to
uniquely identify the relationship between the structural and reduced form
errors B−10 and consequently recover the structural shocks εt. Traditionally,
this would be done with for example recursive short-run restriction with a
Choleski decomposition or long-run restrictions. In the case of identification
through sign restrictions we instead impose restrictions on the responses to
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a shock.
4.2 Identification of a balance sheet shock
The impulse responses can be recovered by looking at the moving average
representations of equation (3):
yt = A(L)−1ut
=
∞∑
i=0
φiut−i
=
∞∑
i=0
φiB
−1
0 εt−i (5)
=
∞∑
i=0
ψiεt−i. (6)
The term φi represents the responses to the reduced-form shocks ut at horizon
i. The responses follow a recursive structure:
φ0 = IK
φ1 = φ0A1
...
φi =
i∑
j=1
φi−jAj, (7)
where the Aj are from the reduced-form system in (3). In case the vector
autoregression is for the differences, the impulse responses for the levels can
be obtained by accumulation. Response for the levels at horizon i is thus
the sum of the responses φo...i for the differences. The term ψi in equation
(6), again, captures the responses of the endogenous variables to a structural
shock. In identification through sign restrictions, we consequently restrict
the signs of the responses stored in ψi.
In practise, the estimation is done with the MATLAB package ZeroSign-
VAR. The following description of the estimation algorithm is based on Bre-
itenlechner, Geiger, and Sindermann (2018).
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1. Estimate the parameters Aˆ1...p and Σˆu of the reduced-form system in
equation (3) using ordinary least squares.
2. Use the estimates Aˆ1...p and Σˆu as location parameters for a Normal-
Inverse-Wishart prior to obtain the same reduced-form parameters from
the posterior.11
3. Assume that equation (4) is a Choleski decomposition, i.e. Σu = PP ′
in order to extract the orthogonal innovations from the model in step 2.
The Choleski decomposition is used for practical reasons as εt = P−1ut
fulfills the condition in equation (2):
Σε = E(P−1utu′tP−1′)
= P−1ΣuP−1′
= P−1PP ′P−1′
= IK .
4. Use the estimated lower triangular Choleski factor P , Aˆ1...p and Σˆu to
obtain candidate responses to the structural shocks ψi = φiP according
to equation (5). Recall that the reduced-form responses are determined
recursively according to equation (7).
5. Multiply the candidate responses from step 4 with a random orthonor-
mal and recursive matrix Q, which satisfies Q′Q = I. This step creates
an alternative candidate response to the structural shocks. The recur-
sive structure of the matrix ensures that the responses are zero when
needed.
6. Check whether the impulse responses fulfill the imposed sign and zero
restrictions. If they do, the responses bear a structural interpretation
and are kept. If not, they are discarded.
11Normal-Inverse-Wishart is a natural conjugate and therefore the posterior takes the
same form.
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7. Repeat steps 5–6 for as many times as you want the number of subdraws
to be.
8. Repeat steps 2–6 for as many times as you wish the number of model
draws to be.
A few points need clarifying. The Choleski decomposition is only used for
orthogonalization, not for identification. The identification is based purely
on the sign and zero restrictions we impose. The final number of candidate
draws is the model draws multiplied by the subdraws. The number of suc-
cessful draws on the other hand depends on the tightness of the identification
strategy. The estimation procedure produces a set of models that each ful-
fill the restriction and are consistent with the data. Therefore identification
through sign restrictions yields set identification, which has to be kept in
mind when interpreting the results. In our case, the results represent median
responses among the satisfactory models. As opposed to for example recur-
sive identification, we additionally only restrict the responses to our shock
of interest. Thus it is important that we present a credible narrative on how
the unconventional monetary policy shock can be separated from the rest
K − 1 shocks. Next we’ll go through our identifying assumptions, which
follow Boeckx et al. (2017).
A shock to central bank’s balance sheet has to be separated from pol-
icy changes that result endogenously from, say, financial stress or consumer
prices. This is necessary in order to draw conclusions about causality. With-
out a surprise element, it could as well be that a change in financial stress
that the ECB acts upon drives changes in real economy rather than the pol-
icy measure. Output and prices are included in the model to account for
the macroeconomic developments that might impact the European Central
Bank’s decisions. The CISS indicator of financial stress is included to cap-
ture endogenous responses to financial instability. Boeckx et al. (2017) show
that the change in the ECB’s balance sheet is closely related to the CISS
indicator. They further indicate that only around 25 percent of the forecast
error variance decomposition of ECB’s balance sheet is driven by exogenous
shocks, which makes it all the more important to identify the exogenous
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shocks correctly.
Table 1: Identification of a shock to the central bank’s balance sheet
GDP CPI ECB’s total assets CISS EONIA-MRO spread MRO
0 0 + - - 0
In order to uncover exogenous innovations, the responses to a structural
unconventional monetary policy shock are restricted according to table 1.
Following Boeckx et al. (2017), it is assumed that the balance sheet shock
does not affect output and consumer prices contemporaneously, that is di-
rectly after the shock. This assumption builds on the idea of sticky prices
and lagged impact of monetary policy on real variables. Real shocks such as
aggregate supply and demand affect output and consumer prices instanta-
neously. We can therefore separate real shocks from the balance sheet shock
based on the first two restrictions in 1.
We naturally expect the size of the European Central Bank’s balance
sheet to increase in response to an expansionary shock to the balance sheet.
Next, we coincide with the original paper in expecting the monetary policy
shock not to increase financial stress. This condition separates the impact
from a policy measure to financial stress from the reverse endogenous mecha-
nism of how monetary policy is determined. It therefore takes care of reversed
causality. Third, we assume that the identified shock does not increase the
EONIA-MRO spread. If the spread were to rise, it would likely be the result
of a increased demand for credit rather than supply.
Finally, our goal is to look at the impact of an expansion of the balance
sheet, given a certain policy rate. Therefore we restrict the contemporaneous
impact on the main refinancing rate to be zero. All three zero restrictions
hold only upon impact, whereas we impose the sign restrictions to hold in-
stantaneously as well as the next period. We, in line with Boeckx et al.
(2017), believe that these restrictions are adequate in identifying the shock
to the balance sheet orthogonal to all other possible shocks in the system.
That is, we trust that our identification has at least one restriction that sep-
arates the unconventional monetary policy shock from all others, but most
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Table 2: Identification of an asset purchase announcement shock
GDP CPI announced purchases CISS EONIA-MRO spread MRO
0 0 + - - 0
importantly, demand shocks.
4.3 Alternative identification approaches
As mentioned above, Boeckx et al. (2017) predict that due to anticipation,
their model is not suitable for identifying the effects of the asset purchase
programs. The purchases are announced in advance, which could cause that
the financial as well as the real market variables react before any purchases
are conducted. Our identification strategy for the balance sheet shock as-
sumes that the size of the balance sheet increases, and thus all reactions
before the balance sheet actually expands are excluded. We address this is-
sue by altering our baseline model in two ways: by substituting the size of
the balance sheet by announced purchases and by excluding the measure for
the balance sheet altogether.
In the announced purchases option we follow Weale and Wieladek (2016).
Similar approach was considered in one of the model specifications in Hesse
et al. (2018). By substituting the size of the balance sheet with announced
purchases, we naturally look at the impact of the announcement of asset pur-
chases, at the time of the announcement. Thus we disregard the impact of
the amount of purchases the central bank actually performs and look at the
signalling effect of monetary policy rather than, say, direct pass-through. In
addition, this approach is only helpful when studying the impact of the asset
purchase programme. We leave targeted longer-term refinancing operations
out because they do not encourage banks to increase lending to the non-
financial sector before the operations are actually implemented. Therefore
we construct a series of the European Central Bank’s accumulated announced
asset purchases based on the timeline explained in section 2.4, but correct
them for the time of announcement from press releases by the central bank.
We thereby identify an asset purchase shock, which should however pro-
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Table 3: Identification of a balance sheet shock excluding ECB total assets
GDP CPI CISS EONIA-MRO spread MRO
0 0 - - 0
duce parallel results to combined unconventional monetary policies targeted
at expanding the balance sheet. The identifying assumptions for the asset
purchase shock are summarized in table 2.
In our second approach we exclude total assets as was done in Hesse et
al. (2018). In this setting we identify a shock to the balance sheet based on
the rest of the variables in our baseline model. In essence, we claim that a
point in time where GDP, consumer prices and the main refinancing opera-
tions rate do not change while financial stress and the EONIA-MRO spread
decrease can only occur due to a shock to the balance sheet. This way we
are able to catch the impact of expansion of the European Central Bank’s
balance sheet, regardless of whether the effect occurs upon announcement of
implementation. On the upside, when using the exclusion approach, we do
not need to discriminate between asset purchases and targeted longer-term
refinancing operations. Therefore any difference between the responses to a
balance sheet shock identified with or without the European Central Bank’s
total assets should be driven by the announcement effects. The identify-
ing assumptions for the balance sheet shock excluding ECB total assets are
summarized in table 3.
Both of our alterations above build on the baseline model and identifica-
tion strategy of Boeckx et al. (2017). It pays off to consider the plausibility of
the identifying assumptions on other dimensions other than the anticipation
effect. For this purpose we consider the analysis of Puonti (2019).
Puonti (2019) studies the validity of the sign restriction imposed in Boeckx
et al. (2017). Puonti (2019) uses statistical identification in her approach and
thus doesn’t have to impose neither zero nor sign restrictions on the variables
in order to identify the shock of interest. The methodology is helpful because
it allows one to compare the impulse responses of the restricted variables to
those in a model where restriction were not made. Puonti (2019) considers
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the same time period as was done in Boeckx et al. (2017) and confirms that
the restrictions used are sensible, except for the zero restriction on GDP.
Puonti (2019) finds that when the instantaneous impact of the shock on
GDP is not restricted to zero, the response actually peaks on impact. For
that reason we consider altering the above identification strategies so that
we restrict the impact on GDP to be non-negative.
The estimation procedure used by Boeckx et al. (2017) is founded in
the seminal work of Uhlig (2005) on identification via sign restrictions. The
pure sign restriction approach used in Uhlig (2005) has received critique for
potentially identifying multiple shocks simultaneously.12 Lanne and Luoto
(2020) confirm that the model by Uhlig (2005) identifies two shocks instead
of one, the other shock being a money demand shock. For this reason, we
assume, more recent takes on models of monetary policy combine sign with
zero restrictions. In case of Boeckx et al. (2017), the zero restrictions on
GDP and prices are used to disentangle a shock to the ECB’s balance sheet
from aggregate demand and supply shocks.
Uhlig (2017) discusses the evolution of monetary policy models that use
sign restrictions. While acknowledging that the sign restrictions in Uhlig
(2005) identify two shocks simultaneously, he does not see zero restrictions
as an improvement in many cases. He brings up the widely used assumption
of sticky prices in monetary shock studies as an example.13 The assumption
of truly non-existent instantaneous impact of a monetary policy shock to
prices does not seem to be credible in reality, as some prices always react.
Therefore inclusion of zero restrictions is not a quick fix, but rather a shift
from potentially misidentifying the monetary policy shock to imposing a
restriction that is implausible with equal probability.
With this discussion we consider easing the zero restrictions on prices as
well as GDP. This should be quite sensible as the analysis of Lanne and Lu-
oto (2020) considers the exact identification of Uhlig (2005) and therefore is
not directly related to our model. In our model specification we assume that
12This possibility was brought up by Uhlig (2005) himself.
13Our model utilizes the same sticky price assumption when imposing a zero restriction
on consumer prices.
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the negative sign restriction on the EONIA-MRO spread disentangles money
demand shocks from our policy shock of interest. In addition, Boeckx et al.
(2017) argue that easing the restriction on output and prices can potentially
cause us to confuse our monetary policy shock with one in the real economy
such as aggregate demand. The monetary policy shock we are interested
in is however distinguished from supply and demand shocks also by the as-
sumption that supply and demand shocks do not affect asset purchases. The
narrative behind the assumption is that, at the time of the announcement,
officials do not know about the current GDP and prices and therefore cannot
endogenously react to them. We are therefore convinced that easing the re-
strictions on GDP and prices does not confuse the balance sheet shock with
others and consider this option as well when we report the results.
4.4 Data
We use the same variables as in Boeckx et al. (2017) in the baseline, six-
variate model. All of the variables are euro area wide. GDP and the con-
sumer price index (CPI) represent the impact on the real economy. Financial
stress is measured by the ECB’s composite indicator of systemic stress (CISS)
introduced by Holló, Kremer, and Lo Duca (2012). The euro overnight in-
dex average (EONIA) stands for the rate at which bank provides loans for
each other with a maturity of one day. The main refinancing operations
(MRO) rate is then again the rate banks pay when they borrow from the
central bank with a maturity of one week. The EONIA-MRO spread conse-
quently measures the difference of those rates and gives insight to liquidity
in the economy. The spread increases at times of tight credit and conversely
decreases with excess liquidity.
Unless stated otherwise, all of the data is taken from the ECB Statistical
Data Warehouse and either interpolated in R or aggregated in SAS, in order
to reach a monthly frequency. The data for EONIA and MRO rates is avail-
able on a daily frequency. We first calculated the daily spread between the
two rates and then aggregated it to a monthly frequency by taking an aver-
age of the daily observations. The CISS indicator was calculated by taking
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an average from weekly observations. Total assets of the ECB were likewise
available on a weekly basis and transformed to a monthly series by taking
the last observation of the month as a closing stock.
We use the harmonized consumer index (HCPI) as the measure for con-
sumer prices. The data is provided by Eurostat14 at a monthly frequency.
The consumer price index uses 2015 as the base year. Preliminary check
revealed seasonality in the data. We therefore seasonally adjusted it with
JDemetra+, a software specifically developed for seasonal adjustment. The
software uses an algorithm called TRAMO/SEATS when dealing with the
data. The procedure decomposes the data into seasonal, trend and irregular
components and then removes the seasonal part. As of February 2015, Eu-
rostat and the European Central Bank suggest that all seasonal adjustment
of official statistics be done with JDemetra+.
The data for real GDP is likewise an index, which uses 2015 as the base
year. In addition, the data is seasonally and calendar adjusted by the ECB.
GDP is however only available at a quarterly frequency. Therefore we fol-
lowed the example of Boeckx et al. (2017) and constructed a monthly series
with Chow-Lin interpolation procedure. The interpolation uses industrial
production as the indicator series, that is in creating the artificial monthly
variation.15 We are interested in the post-crisis period and therefore limit
our data to run from 2010 onward. We follow the literature in estimating our
model in (log) levels.16 Based on descriptive analysis we include trend as well
as a constant term in our reduced-form VAR. The model is trend-stationary,
that is, after including the trend term the characteristic roots lie within unit
circle.
We augment the model explained above with data from Finland to study
the impact of unconventional monetary policy on Finnish firms of different
size. Since our assumption is that small firms benefit from easing credit con-
ditions, we study their response separately. We are additionally interested in
finding possible asymmetries between size groups. To study this, we consider
14Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union.
15The interpolation was executed with the tempdisagg package available in R.
16For example Boeckx et al. (2017), Hesse et al. (2018) and Weale and Wieladek (2016)
all use levels in their estimation.
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the responses of large firms to a balance sheet shock and compare the results
to those from small firms.
The thesis is written on the premises of Statistics Finland, which grants
us access to a wide variety of firm-level data. The Trend Indicator of Output
is primarily based on a monthly survey data Statistics Finland collects from
large firms. The sales inquiry covers altogether 2000 companies that are
considered most significant per number of employees and/or turnover. The
sample is however balanced such that all industries are included. It covers
around 70 % of total sales and 0.1 to 5.9 percent of the number of firms per
industry in Finland. The sample is not static. Instead, the sample is revised
on a monthly basis in case of corporate acquisitions. Firms with declining
turnovers are replaced with ones that have increased their sales once a year.
Small firms are underrepresented in the survey by default. The composition
of the firms makes it infeasible to rely on the survey data alone in studying the
differences of small and large firms. Even if one were to exclude the largest
firms from the data set, the remaining set of enterprises would unlikely be
a unbiased sample of small firms. The remaining data would cover only the
largest fraction of the body of firms we wish to study. Therefore additional
data is needed.
On top of the survey Statistics Finland collects themselves, they have
micro data on all the firms in the economy, based on tax returns on value-
added tax. The data is collected on three different frequencies depending
on firm size. The group of firms with a yearly turnover worth less than
30,000 euros file the return yearly. Those with a turnover between 30,000
and 100,000 file it quarterly and the largest firms monthly. Luckily, even the
last group includes firms that are reasonably small and thus we can limit our
focus on it.
We construct the data for Finland by combining information from two
sources, the sales inquiry and the tax figures. We use the sales inquiry data as
the series for large firms as opposed to constructing one from scratch with the
value-added tax data. The reason is that we are interested in seeing whether
a shock to the balance sheet distorts the Trend Indicator of Output through
source data. Best way to do so is to use the actual data set the indicator
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uses in our analysis as well. We then exclude the firms included in the sales
inquiry each month from the tax data. From the remaining body of firms we
isolate those that are regarded as small by EU standards.17 We focus on the
turnover of small firms as opposed to micro firms due to the fact that small
firms are more homogeneous. Micro firms include both self-employed people
as well as startups and therefore we expect the data for micro firms to be
noisy. In summary, our series for large firms is based on the sales inquiry,
whereas the data for small comes from tax data. As our variables of interest
we use series for both the turnover of large and small firms.
Firm size is determined based on the financial statement provided at the
end of the year. Multinational firms pose additional complexity into the
picture, as their headcount and turnover have to be partitioned among the
countries they operate in. Therefore the size classification for the data for
2019 is not ready at the time of writing in March 2020, and we have no choice
but to exclude 2019 from our estimations. It is problematic that ultimately
our data covers the period 2010M01–2018M12, which is only 108 data points
per series. This can consequently affect the sharpness of our results. The
same issue was however present in the work by Boeckx et al. (2017) and even
more so in Weale and Wieladek (2016). Short timelines are therefore usual
in the relevant literature, which is natural as unconventional measures have
not been in use for long.
The turnover data for large and small firms enter the model separately.
If it were the case that the euro area GDP is an accurate indicator of Finnish
turnover data, we would have exact multicollinearity and the model would not
be valid. Following Rieth, Piffer, and Hachula (2016)18, we however assume
that data from a single member state is not a proxy for GDP. Both the series
for small and large firms contained seasonality, which was dealt with using
the TRAMO/SEATS algorithm. Both variables additionally enter the model
in logs.
17Small firms are defined in the EU as having a staff headcount between 10 and 50
employees or alternatively an annual turnover of more than two but less than 10 million
euros.
18Rieth et al. (2016) study the impact of unconventional monetary policy on macroe-
conomy in Germany.
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We are convinced that our choice of frequency and identification serve
the purpose of our study. Event studies employing high frequency data are
probably well suited for uncovering the transmission of monetary policy to
the financial sector. Then again, the impact on macroeconomic variables
presumably does not emerge within days, or even more so, hours of the
announcement of the policy. Joyce, Miles, Scott, and Vayanos (2012) verifies
the reasoning that event studies are not suitable for finding macroeconomic
impacts. Therefore our SVAR model of unconventional monetary policy with
a monthly frequency is reasonable. We however take possible anticipation
effect into consideration with robustness checks.
5 Results
In this section we’ll go through the results from our estimations. Our model
is the six-variate model of unconventional monetary policy introduced by
Boeckx et al. (2017), augmented with Finnish turnover data. We study
the impact on large and small firms separately. We identify a shock to
the European Central Bank’s balance sheet using sign and zero restrictions
identically to what was done in Boeckx et al. (2017). We considered several
alterations to the identification strategy in section 4.3 and, for robustness,
report the results from these exercises as well.
We consider a sample period of 2010:M1–2018:M12 throughout. The
Schwarz lag length selection criteria suggests using one lag. We consider
such a short lag order to conflict with existing literature too much and there-
fore use three lags similarly to Boeckx et al. (2017). All of the impulse
responses are a result of the Bayesian estimation procedure explained in sec-
tion 4.2. The figures represent the median response among all of the models
that produced impulse responses that fulfilled our imposed restriction. We
consider responses where zero is not included in two thirds of the posterior
distribution (the darker gray area in the subsequent figures), to be signif-
icant. The responses of the variables in logs can be read as percentages.
We compare results obtained by different identification procedures and finish
with a discussion.
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5.1 Balance sheet shock with ECB total assets
Figures 3 and 4 represents the results for our baseline model. In this identi-
fication strategy, an unconventional monetary policy shock is characterized
by an increase in ECB’s total assets, which persists for about three months
before fading out to trend. The shock instantaneously increases GDP. The
impact stays significant for a few months and finally declines to negative,
but insignificant figures after 20 periods. The impact on prices becomes pos-
itive instantly after the zero restriction quits binding. The positive response
persists for some 45 months but is significant for only a handful of periods
midway. The balance sheet shock significantly decreases financial stress for
5 months following the innovation. The downward pressure on the EONIA-
MRO spread stays significant for a few months after the shock. The impact
on the main refinancing operation rate is significantly positive from 7–14
months after the shock, which is somewhat surprising as the rate has been
raised on only two occasions during our sample period.
In figure 3, our variable of interest is the turnover of small firms. The
response is significant only at lag seven, where it is between 0.1 and 0.3
percent. The positive impact fades to trend after 20 months. In figure 4,
we again look at the impact on the largest firms in Finland. The response
is positive and significant at one or two periods around 15 months after
the shock. The impact for large firms is however more modest as it peaks
between 0.01 and 0.15 percent. Therefore the impact on firms of different
size is not entirely symmetrical. Small firms respond stronger and earlier,
but the impact on large firms is more persistent. Thus heterogeneous firms in
Finland respond to an unconventional monetary policy shock identified with
the size of the European Central Bank’s balance sheet differently, but very
modestly so. We’ll go through the results from our alternative identification
methods before discussing the validity of this result.
5.2 Asset purchase announcement shock
We move on to consider the possible announcement effects. We assess them
by replacing the size of the balance sheet with a series of the European
51
Figure 3: The impact of a balance sheet shock on small firms. The order
of the variables from left to right, top to bottom is GDP, CPI, ECB total
assets, CISS, EONIA-MRO spread, MRO rate and the turnover of small
firms. The impulse responses of GDP, CPI and MRO rate are restricted to
being zero upon impact. The response of ECB total assets is assumed non-
negative. Conversely, the responses of financial stress and the EONIA-MRO
spread are assumed non-positive. The sign restrictions are in place for two
periods. The turnover of small firms is left unrestricted. The figures show
median responses with the light and dark gray areas representing 90% and
two thirds of the identified posterior distribution, respectively.
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Figure 4: The impact of a balance sheet shock on large firms. The order
of the variables from left to right, top to bottom is GDP, CPI, ECB total
assets, CISS, EONIA-MRO spread, MRO rate and the turnover of large
firms. The impulse responses of GDP, CPI and MRO rate are restricted to
being zero upon impact. The response of ECB total assets is assumed non-
negative. Conversely, the responses of financial stress and the EONIA-MRO
spread are assumed non-positive. The sign restrictions are in place for two
periods. The turnover of large firms is left unrestricted. The figures show
median responses with the light and dark gray areas representing 90% and
two thirds of the identified posterior distribution, respectively.
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Figure 5: The impact of an asset purchase announcement shock on small
firms. The order of the variables from left to right, top to bottom is GDP,
CPI, ECB’s announced asset purchases, CISS, EONIA-MRO spread, MRO
rate and the turnover of small firms. The impulse responses of GDP, CPI
and MRO rate are restricted to being zero upon impact. The response of
ECB’s announced asset purchases is assumed non-negative. Conversely, the
responses of financial stress and the EONIA-MRO spread are assumed non-
positive. The sign restrictions are in place for two periods. The turnover of
small firms is left unrestricted. The figures show median responses with the
light and dark gray areas representing 90% and two thirds of the identified
posterior distribution, respectively.
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Figure 6: The impact of an asset purchase announcement shock on large
firms. The order of the variables from left to right, top to bottom is GDP,
CPI, ECB’s announced asset purchases, CISS, EONIA-MRO spread, MRO
rate and the turnover of large firms. The impulse responses of GDP, CPI
and MRO rate are restricted to being zero upon impact. The response of
ECB’s announced asset purchases is assumed non-negative. Conversely, the
responses of financial stress and the EONIA-MRO spread are assumed non-
positive. The sign restrictions are in place for two periods. The turnover of
large firms is left unrestricted. The figures show median responses with the
light and dark gray areas representing 90% and two thirds of the identified
posterior distribution, respectively.
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Central Bank’s announced asset purchases in the baseline model by Boeckx
et al. (2017). Therefore we identify an asset purchase announcement shock,
which differs from the baseline shock such that it covers anticipation effects,
but excludes targeted longer-term refinancing operations. The responses can
be seen from figures 5 and 6. The announcement shock is characterized by a
rise in announced purchases, which lasts for some six months before fading
out.
The impact on GDP is less pronounced than in the case of a balance
sheet shock. The positive early impact is insignificant and the response even
becomes significantly negative after around 27 months. The impact on prices
is then again bigger and significant for years, especially in the model with
small firms. The announcement shock furthermore decreases financial stress
significantly for some five months in figures 5 and 6. The impact fades at
a slower pace than in the case of a balance sheet shock. The impact on
financial stress additionally fluctuates between positive and negative. This
pattern was not as visible in figures 3 and 4, which suggests that the two
specifications do not catch exactly the same shock. The same fluctuating
pattern can be seen on the impact on the EONIA-MRO spread. The impact
of the main refinancing operations rate is quite the same. The positive impact
must, again, be driven by the beginning of the time series as the rate has not
been risen towards the end of the decade.
Our variable of interest in figure 5 is again the turnover of small firms.
The impact of the announcement shock on small firms is bigger and more
persistent than it was with the balance sheet shock. The positive impact
peaks at lag three, where it is between 0.1 and 0.4 percent. The median
response is once more significant and around 0.2 percent after five and up
until 18 months. Figure 6 contains the response of the turnover of large
firms. The impulse responses between the two size groups are fairly similar.
The main difference is that, after the simultaneous peak at lag three, the
response is significant again after 12 and up until 20 months. On top of
being more sluggish, the latter response is also lower for the large firms, that
is the median is around 0.1 percent.
The responses to a balance sheet shock and an announcement shock have
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interesting differences. The response of GDP to an asset purchase announce-
ment shock is less significant, whereas the opposite is true for prices. The
response of both turnovers peak almost instantaneously, which was not vis-
ible in figures 3 and 4. Therefore it seems that as assumed in Boeckx et al.
(2017), the baseline model is not able to catch the early responses to a policy
measure targeted at expanding the balance sheet of the European Central
Bank. It could on the other hand be that the differences are driven by the
fact that the announcement shock specified here excludes targeted longer-
term refinancing operations. We therefore consider an alternative approach
to including the announcement effects, in which the refinancing operations
are not excluded.
5.3 Balance sheet shock excluding ECB total assets
We proceed onto our second exercise with the aim to find out whether an-
ticipation effects play a role in the transmission of unconventional monetary
policy in the euro area. We consider the approach of Hesse et al. (2018) and
simply exclude total assets of the central bank from the vector autoregres-
sion. The identification otherwise follows that of Boeckx et al. (2017). The
advantage of this approach is that is does not discriminate between different
unconventional monetary policy measures, as long as they affect the other
variables in the model identically. Thus we assume to find combined results
for the asset purchase programme as well as targeted longer-term refinancing
operations.
Figures 7 and 8 show the impulse responses to a balance sheet shock
identified without the central bank’s total assets. The results closely resemble
those found as a response to an asset purchase announcement shock in figures
5 and 6. Therefore it seems that the (assumed) inclusion of the targeted
longer-term refinancing operations does not drastically change the picture.
Most significant difference can be found in the response of GDP. In the
estimation including large firms, it is significant for a few periods, as was in
the baseline approach in figure 4. The difference is nevertheless small and
cannot be seen in the model including turnover of small firms. Thus the
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Figure 7: The impact of a balance sheet shock excluding ECB total assets
on small firms. The order of the variables from left to right, top to bottom is
GDP, CPI, CISS, EONIA-MRO spread, MRO rate and the turnover of small
firms. The impulse responses of GDP, CPI and MRO rate are restricted to
being zero upon impact. The responses of financial stress and the EONIA-
MRO spread are assumed non-positive. The sign restrictions are in place for
two periods. The turnover of small firms is left unrestricted. The figures
show median responses with the light and dark gray areas representing 90%
and two thirds of the identified posterior distribution, respectively.
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Figure 8: The impact of a balance sheet shock excluding ECB total assets
on large firms. The order of the variables from left to right, top to bottom is
GDP, CPI, CISS, EONIA-MRO spread, MRO rate and the turnover of large
firms. The impulse responses of GDP, CPI and MRO rate are restricted to
being zero upon impact. The responses of financial stress and the EONIA-
MRO spread are assumed non-positive. The sign restrictions are in place
for two periods. The turnover of large firms is left unrestricted. The figures
show median responses with the light and dark gray areas representing 90%
and two thirds of the identified posterior distribution, respectively.
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picture stays the same for the euro area variables with both approaches that
take announcement effects into account.
The impulse responses of the turnovers of large and small firms also re-
semble those we saw with an announcement shock. The impact on small
firms in figure 7 is virtually identical to the response in figure 5. Thus the
peak impact is again between 0.1 and 0.4 percent. Interestingly, the response
of turnover of large firms is then again insignificant directly after the shock.
The spike on lag three is visible but much less pronounced than with the
asset purchase announcement shock. This could be due to the inclusion (or
rather, lack of exclusion) of the refinancing operations. The reasoning is that
as they are targeted in expanding lending to SMEs, including them dampens
the clearly visible impact of the asset purchases.
It is further worth noting that the positive impact on large firms between,
say, periods 10 and 22 is significant also with the refinancing operations
included. Therefore large firms respond to the two measures differently only
upon impact. This suggests that there are two separate responses; one related
to the announcement of the measure and another, more sluggish one. It is
likely that there are different transmission channels of monetary policy at play
behind the dual response. We discuss this when concluding. To summarize, it
seems that announcement effects contribute significantly to the transmission
of unconventional monetary policy targeted at expanding the ECB’s balance
sheet. The impact is visible on both the euro wide variables as well as on
the turnover of firms of different size in Finland. It further seems that the
responses to refinancing operations and asset purchases are symmetrical for
small firms, but not for large.
5.4 Easing the zero restrictions
We’ll next see how easing the zero constraint on GDP and prices affects the
responses to an unconventional monetary policy shock. For this exercise we
chose the approach of identifying a shock to the balance sheet excluding ECB
total assets, as that takes care of the announcement effects while including
the targeted longer-term refinancing operations. The discussion for easing
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Figure 9: The impact of a balance sheet shock identified without ECB total
assets (when GDP is restricted non-negative) on small firms. The order of
the variables from left to right, top to bottom is GDP, CPI, CISS, EONIA-
MRO spread, MRO rate and the turnover of small firms. The impulse re-
sponses of CPI and MRO rate are restricted to being zero upon impact. The
response of GDP is assumed non-negative. Conversely, the responses of fi-
nancial stress and the EONIA-MRO spread are assumed non-positive. The
sign restrictions are in place for two periods. The turnover of small firms
is left unrestricted. The figures show median responses with the light and
dark gray areas representing 90% and two thirds of the identified posterior
distribution, respectively.
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Figure 10: The impact of a balance sheet shock identified without ECB total
assets (when GDP is restricted non-negative) on large firms. The order of
the variables from left to right, top to bottom is GDP, CPI, CISS, EONIA-
MRO spread, MRO rate and the turnover of large firms. The impulse re-
sponses of CPI and MRO rate are restricted to being zero upon impact. The
response of GDP is assumed non-negative. Conversely, the responses of fi-
nancial stress and the EONIA-MRO spread are assumed non-positive. The
sign restrictions are in place for two periods. The turnover of large firms
is left unrestricted. The figures show median responses with the light and
dark gray areas representing 90% and two thirds of the identified posterior
distribution, respectively.
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the zero restrictions on the real variables can be found in section 4.3. We
begin by allowing GDP to be positive but continue to restrict the impact on
prices to zero, in line with Puonti (2019). The results can be seen in figures
9 and 10. All of the responses are significant even when considering the light
gray area of 90% of the posterior mass. The identification seems tighter when
the zero restriction on GDP is eased.
As anticipated, the response of GDP peaks slightly earlier at around
seven months after the shock as a result to easing of the zero constraint. The
positive impact is significant for some 12 months and finally fades out to
trend around the 20 period mark. The impact is on the other hand slightly
more sluggish than Puonti (2019) found when studying the exact time period
used by Boeckx et al. (2017). The response turns negative after 20 periods,
but unlike in Puonti (2019), the negative impact is significant as well. The
response of euro area prices stays fairly similar to the responses found with
other specifications, it only peaks slightly higher and is significant for a longer
period. The responses of the financial variables likewise stay the same as in
the other approaches including anticipation effects.
The results for small firms can be seen in figure 9. At a first glance it is
evident that compared to other specifications, there is much less noise in the
response at the first period after the shock. Consequently, the scale of the
figure is different, even though the size of the impact is roughly the same.
The spike at lag three is not as pronounced and the response peaks later, that
is seven periods after the shock, being between 0.12 and 0.32%. Therefore the
peak impulse response of small firms is slightly lower, but highly significant.
The positive impact is furthermore significant for altogether some 12 periods
before fading.
Interestingly, the impulse response of large firms in figure 10 resembles
that found in response to an announcement shock rather than balance sheet
shock excluding ECB total assets. Thus the hypothesis about the inclusion
of the refinancing operations muffling the response of large firms seems to
be reversed here. The impact on large firms in figure 8 was not due to the
targeted longer-term refinancing operations, but rather timing. The impact
on large firms peaks earlier than before at two months after the shock, where
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it is between 0.07 and 0.4 percent. The positive impact peaks again around
17 months after the shock, where the median response is a little under 0.2%.
The response finally fades 35 months after the innovation.
The response of large firms is thus both stronger and more persistent
than with other approaches. Large firms additionally outperform smaller
firms in response to the innovation, which contradicts the results from other
approaches. As the responses of the euro area variables are also more signif-
icant, we have to consider the possibility that figures 9 and 10 represent the
responses to several shocks at once. Boeckx et al. (2017) separate shocks to
the real economy from the balance sheet shock by assuming both that the
balance sheet shock does not instantaneously impact the real variables and
that real shocks do not affect ECB’s balance sheet. As we have eased the
zero restriction on GDP and excluded ECB’s total assets from our model, we
are no longer assured that we are able to disentangle the two shocks.
To see whether misidentification is driving the better performance of large
firms, we compare the results in figures 9 and 10 to responses to an asset
purchase announcement shock, whilst easing the zero restriction on GDP.
Similarly to before, we assume that real shocks do not impact the European
Central Bank’s announced asset purchases, because the ECB does not have
exact knowledge about the present state of the economy. This enables us to
credibly disentangle the two shocks once more. The responses to a announce-
ment shock can be seen in figures 11 and 12. The response of large firms
is fairly similar in both approaches, but the comparison of the size groups
changes as the spike for small firms at lag three is bigger. The response of
small firms is similar to what was seen before easing the zero restriction, with
both the announcement and the balance sheet shocks. Therefore it could well
be that figures 9 and 10 represent responses to more than one shock. Before
discussing our final results, we however consider the exercise of easing the
zero constraint on prices as well.
We additionally eased the zero restrictions on both real variables in accor-
dance with the discussion in Uhlig (2017) and in section 4.3. The responses
were fairly similar. The impact on GDP was however positive for a mere
moment before turning significantly negative, which we find to be an im-
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Figure 11: The impact of an asset purchase announcement shock (when
GDP is restricted non-negative) on small firms. The order of the variables
from left to right, top to bottom is GDP, CPI, ECB’s announced purchases,
CISS, EONIA-MRO spread, MRO rate and the turnover of small firms. The
impulse responses of CPI and MRO rate are restricted to being zero upon
impact. The responses of GDP and announced purchases are assumed non-
negative. Conversely, the responses of financial stress and the EONIA-MRO
spread are assumed non-positive. The sign restrictions are in place for two
periods. The turnover of small firms is left unrestricted. The figures show
median responses with the light and dark gray areas representing 90% and
two thirds of the identified posterior distribution, respectively.
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Figure 12: The impact of an asset purchase announcement shock (when
GDP is restricted non-negative) on large firms. The order of the variables
from left to right, top to bottom is GDP, CPI, ECB’s announced purchases,
CISS, EONIA-MRO spread, MRO rate and the turnover of large firms. The
impulse responses of CPI and MRO rate are restricted to being zero upon
impact. The response of GDP and announced purchases are assumed non-
negative. Conversely, the responses of financial stress and the EONIA-MRO
spread are assumed non-positive. The sign restrictions are in place for two
periods. The turnover of large firms is left unrestricted. The figures show
median responses with the light and dark gray areas representing 90% and
two thirds of the identified posterior distribution, respectively.
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plausibly adverse reaction. Therefore we assume that the zero restriction
upon impact on euro area consumer prices is sensible and leave the results
unpublished.
5.5 Discussion
We have identified an unconventional monetary policy shock affecting the
central bank’s balance sheet in three different ways; through the size of the
balance sheet, based on announced asset purchases and through the impact
of a balance sheet expansion on the rest of the variables in our model. The
baseline specification in line with Boeckx et al. (2017) did not catch antici-
pation effects that manifested as spikes in the responses of the turnovers of
Finnish firms a few moths after the shock. The two other approaches were
successful in catching the early responses of firms.
We found the approach in fashion of Hesse et al. (2018) most appeal-
ing on paper, as it takes the anticipation effects into account and further
does not discriminate between policy measures. Therefore, for robustness,
we considered the analysis of Puonti (2019) and eased the zero restriction
on GDP in the identification of a balance sheet shock, excluding ECB total
assets. The identification turned out to be sharper when the GDP was re-
stricted non-negative. There is however a possibility that the easing of the
zero restriction on GDP causes the model to be misidentified and therefore
we repeated the exercise with the asset purchase announcement shock in line
with, for example, Weale and Wieladek (2016). The comparison between the
turnovers of large and small firms changed quite significantly and thus we
base our conclusions on the results from both the identification in line with
Hesse et al. (2018) and Weale and Wieladek (2016), but with the response
of GDP eased only with the latter.
The response to a balance sheet shock excluding ECB total assets peaks
higher for small firms but is more persistent for large when the zero restriction
on GDP is in place. In case of an announcement shock, the overall impact on
small firms is higher and also more persistent. When the zero restriction on
GDP is eased, the peak impact of small firms is still higher, but the response
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is less persistent than that of large firms.19 Therefore the impact on small
firms peaks higher with all specifications, but on average, the response is
more persistent when it comes to the turnover of large firms.
We are thus unable to conclude that small firms would disproportionately
benefit from monetary policy measures targeted at expanding the balance
sheet of the central bank. The impact of the unconventional measures is
asymmetrical, but the difference is in favor of small firms in the first 10 or so
periods after the shock, and of large firms after that. Thus, the differences
somewhat cancel each other out in the long run.
Therefore it is also safe to say that unconventional monetary policy is not
driving the revisions of the Trend Indicator of Output, which sparked our
interest in the topic in the first place. If it were, the revisions would have
fluctuated above and below zero based on how much time had passed since the
the last unconventional monetary policy innovation. The reason why small
firms have outperformed large in Finland, and therefore the explanation of
the revisions of the trend indicator, remains a mystery.
Our conclusion is in contrast with the seminal result of Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994), at least if we believe that the results found in response
to an expansionary shock should be a mirror image to the period of credit
crunch the original paper focused on. Then again, the result in Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) was that the impact of a monetary policy tightening depends
on the phase of the business cycle. Therefore it might be that the expansion-
ary monetary measures in 2010–2018 did not benefit small firms in Finland
disproportionately due to the fact that, for the most part, the economy was
not in an acute economic slump.
It was also the hypothesis of Hesse et al. (2018), that the impact of
unconventional monetary policy diminishes as the economy is no longer in
severe economic distress. The results by Hesse et al. (2018) show that early
asset purchases had a significant effect on the real variables in the US and
UK, but that the more recent purchases have not been as efficient. Our
results point at the same direction. The responses of the real variables in
19It should be noted that the results for large and small firms are from different models,
which introduces some uncertainty into our comparisons.
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the baseline model in line with Boeckx et al. (2017) were significantly less
pronounced than in the original paper. The same is true for the results
building on the approach of Hesse et al. (2018). Therefore the aggregate
impact of the European Central Bank’s balance sheet policies seems to have
weakened over time. The results by Boeckx et al. (2017) and Hesse et al.
(2018) however did not consider the impact of the policies on firms and thus
we have no point of comparison for our results concerning the asymmetry of
the responses of large and small firms.
The pattern of the impact on firms is interesting. Introducing announce-
ment effects to the baseline model revealed a short but strong positive impact
a couple of months after the shock. As the impact occurs shortly after the
innovation, the spike-shaped response is likely due to the signalling channel
of monetary policy.20 It could for example be that the measures taken by
the European Central Bank increased expected inflation, which boosted con-
sumption and thus increased the turnover of Finnish firms. This response
is of similar magnitude for both size groups, which is as expected in case of
increased demand. There is however another, more sluggish wave of response
to monetary policy measures by both the turnovers of large and small firms.
With most specifications, the later response is bigger for small firms, but
more persistent for large. The shape differs slightly between the two groups.
For large firms there is a gradual build-up to the second peak, whereas the
turnover of small firms peak for the second time shortly after the first spike.
Our hypothesis was that the unconventional measures eased the access
to credit for small firms through the banking sector. We further expected
this impact to favor small firms over large, as we assume that the large firms
weren’t credit constrained to begin with. Based on a quick glance, it seems
that the eased access to credit has had a significant impact, but for both
large and small firms. We are however unable to distinguish between different
transmission channels based on shock analysis alone. It might well be, for
example, that the policy measures taken in the euro zone have depreciated the
euro, which again has boosted exports. Large firms might be more export-
20See section 3.3 for an overview of the transmission channels of (un)conventional mon-
etary policy.
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driven and thus benefit more from the exchange rate channel. To summarize,
we have established the impact of unconventional monetary policy measures
targeted at expanding the ECB’s balance sheet on the turnover of Finnish
firms aggregated by size. Event studies with qualitative micro data are more
suitable for determining exactly how monetary policy transmits to the firm
level. This work is left for future research.
6 Conclusions
In this thesis we investigate the impact of unconventional monetary pol-
icy targeted at expanding the balance sheet of the European Central Bank
on Finnish firms. More specifically, we look for asymmetries between the
responses of large and small firms to the asset purchase programme and tar-
geted longer-term refinancing operations. We are additionally interested in
finding out whether the expansionary monetary policy in the euro zone that
has prevailed for most of the decade has created bias in timely statistics that
typically rest on data collected from large firms.
Our interest was sparked by the fact that the earliest estimate of the state
of the economy provided by the statistical authorities in Finland, namely the
Trend Indicator of Output, has on average underestimated the month-on-
month change during the time the monetary policy has been loose. That is,
the growth rate of the economy has consistently been revised upwards after
data from small firms has become available for nearly six years and counting.
Our hypothesis is consequently that small firms have benefited from balance
sheet policies more than large, up to the point where it is visible in the data.
We compare the impact on two turnover series; the first one being the sales
inquiry data for large firms the TIO builds on and the other one a monthly
series for the aggregated turnover of firms that are considered small by EU
standards. By using the the sales inquiry data we are able to simultaneously
look for asymmetries between size groups as well as to directly see whether
there is potential for bias in the TIO.
We study the impact of the ECB’s balance sheet policies on turnovers
of the heterogeneous firms using a vector autoregressive model in line with
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Boeckx et al. (2017). In the baseline model a structural balance sheet shock
is identified such that it is expected to increase the size of the European
Central Bank’s balance sheet and decrease financial stress as well as the
EONIA-MRO spread. The responses of GDP, consumer prices and the main
refinancing operations rate are assumed zero upon impact. The turnovers of
large and small firms enter the model separate and their responses are left
unrestricted.
We augment the analysis with several alterations to the aforementioned
baseline model with the aim of catching the timing of the responses better.
Our alternative approaches of identifying a balance sheet shock based on
the rest of the variables in the model in spirit of Hesse et al. (2018) and a
asset purchase announcement shock building on Weale and Wieladek (2016)
caught earlier responses than the baseline model. The identification is further
sharpened by the easing of the zero constraint of GDP, as suggested by Puonti
(2019). Therefore we base our conclusions on results from the altered versions
of the model.
The impact on both small and large firms is positive and unfolds in two
stages; upon impact and again significantly later. We find asymmetry in the
responses of firms of different size. On average, small firms peak higher and
earlier, whereas the response of large firms persists for longer. The balance
sheet policies benefit small firms more within 12 months of the shock, after
which the impact on large firms is more significant. Therefore we are unable
to conclude that the unconventional monetary policy measures would have
benefited small firms disproportionately. Then again we find evidence, on the
one hand, that the balance sheet policies have affected the turnover of firms
in Finland through more than one monetary policy transmission channel. On
the other hand, our results suggest that the impact of the European Central
Bank’s unconventional monetary policy measures has diminished since the
analysis of Boeckx et al. (2017).
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